Mr. Cassell, I will turn the floor over to you. 1 2 MR. CASSELL: Thank you very much, your Honor. And the victims' families very much appreciate you 3 4 scheduling a hearing on these motions. 5 I know we have four motions in front of the Court I know your time is also very valuable, so I will 6 7 try to get through them as expeditiously as possible. THE COURT: I've got the morning set aside for 8 9 vou. 10 MR. CASSELL: All right. I want to start with what I think is the central motion in this case, and that's 11 12 the Crime Victims' Rights Act or CVRA motion, because I 13 think some of the other issues end up revolving around that. 14 There's a related motion. Our motion for 15 disclosure of information from the government that connects 16 into that. 17 And as you are aware, we also have a supervisory powers motion and an arraignment motion. But let me just 18 19 try to jump right into what I think is the main issue here, 2.0 the Crime Victims' Rights Act. 21 There are three rights that are important. 22 the Crime Victims' Rights Act was passed in 2004 to 23 restructure the federal criminal justice system. 2.4 It's essentially a bill of rights for crime 25 victims. And there are three rights that I will be

referring to today that are obviously essential to our moving papers.

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The first is the right to confer with a government attorney on a case. The second is the right to timely notice of a deferred prosecution agreement or DPA.

And the third is the right to be treated with fairness. I really don't think there's any dispute that if the victims' families are representing crime victims under the CVRA, then the government has violated their rights.

The government has admitted they never conferred with the families. In fact, they've apologized for not conferring with the families. In their brief they promise that they're going to make sure this never happens again.

to confer was a failure to confer with crime victims.

There's also no dispute that the government did not give the victims' families any notice whatsoever of the DPA. It was filed on this Court's docket without any notice to 346 families.

So the issue is whether, in this case, the failure

And there's no dispute that the government deceived the victims by telling them that there was no investigation going on in the crashes when, in fact, there was.

So, if the Court rules in our favor on the crime victim issue, we think, like a set of dominoes, the

violation of the act is clear.

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So the issue then is, are the victims' families who are here representing the family members who were killed in the crashes, are they representing crime victims?

The CVRA says a crime victim is a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the crime. We've cited legislative history in our papers that Congress used an intentionally broad definition to try to create an expansive set of protections for victims in the Crime Victims' Rights Act.

We've cited the Fifth Circuit authorities, including Fisher I from the Fifth Circuit, a case I argued in 2011. And the Fifth Circuit says that you look initially to the crime at issue, but you can look beyond that to see the effects of the crime in making the crime victim determination.

And just one last procedural point, because I think the government's briefing has kind of obscured the key issue here. The government has referred to proof beyond a reasonable doubt at various points in its papers, but that's the standard of proof that your Honor would use or the jury would use at the conclusion of a criminal trial when a defendant's liberty is at stake.

Of course, we're here this morning on pretrial motions, and the standard of proof for those kinds of

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motions is preponderance of the evidence. And we've cited in our brief a number of CVRA cases from the District Court from the Sixth Circuit holding, I think without any disputes from any other courts in the country, that the standard of proof that you would apply to this is preponderance of the evidence: Who has the better of the argument?

And obviously we believe that the evidence shows that we do. And, in fact, we've had four arguments advanced in our papers as to why the crash victims were crime victims under the CVRA. So let me dive right into those different arguments that we have.

Let me take two together. The first two that we've laid out is during the crash investigation, the crash victims were crime victims. And then ultimately, when the DPA was the outcome of that investigation, again, the crash victims were crime victims.

The Court's well aware -- I know that you've recently been involved in some other litigation concerning two crashes on October 29th, 2018, and then March 10th, 2019 -- the Justice Department began investigating those crashes.

Now, again, I make that assertion, the government has been a little bit coy about this in their briefs. They haven't told us exactly what they were doing, but we've been able to piece together from documents that cannot be

reasonably disputed that, after those crashes, the government began investigating the crashes.

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For example, in our papers we cite the Form 10-K that Boeing filed in January of 2020, which said it was cooperating with the Justice Department's investigation into the crashes.

And the victims' families, some of the family members seated here, read Boeing's announcement that they were cooperating with the criminal investigation. So they called the Justice Department.

In fact, they called the Crime Victims Rights ombudsman and said, we are reading in the papers that you're investigating the crashes. We want to confer. We want to talk to you about our losses in the case and how we think the case should be resolved.

What the government said, ironically through the victims' rights ombudsman is, no such investigation, and victims were confused by that. They called the FBI, the victim witness office. And there, again, they were told there is no investigation into the crashes.

Now, let's not mince words. Those were false statements that the United States Department of Justice gave to 346 grieving families around the world. They've admitted it was inaccurate information because they were investigating the crashes.

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And there's been no explanation offered, no affidavits, no information, no explanation whatsoever from the Justice Department about how it could make those false representations to the families out there.

So now the government's investigation continues for another 11 months with the families thinking there's no criminal investigation. So you can imagine the shock and dismay when families around the world learn on Twitter or Facebook or something like that that the government has cut a secret deal with Boeing that will the block its criminal prosecution for the crashes.

Now, I think it violates fundamental human decency to think that you could spring an announcement like that on victims' families. But critically, for today's hearing, it clearly violated the Crime Victims' Rights Act.

I mentioned already one of the provisions in the Crime Victims' Rights Act is a provision requiring that the Justice Department provide timely notice of a deferred prosecution.

We've explained in our papers, Congress added that provision, Senator Cruz and others worked on amending the CVRA to expand it so that it included timely notice of a deferred prosecution agreement so the victims could be heard and potentially shape the outcome of that deferred prosecution agreement.

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We've also cited In re Dean, a case that I argued to the Fifth Circuit in 2018. And in In re Dean, the Fifth Circuit clearly held that the CVRA applies even before charges are filed.

The reason for that, said the Fifth Circuit, is Congress has made a policy decision, which courts are bound to enforce, that victims have the right to be heard during the plea bargaining process, and that simply didn't happen here.

And as a result, we know that the government has clearly violated the rights of crime victims. Let's be clear. What does that DPA do?

Again, the government was a little vague when it crafted it. Your Honor may have seen what I think are the standard approaches to deferred prosecution agreements, where the agreement will spell out specifically which crimes are covered, which defendants are being immunized or precluded from prosecution.

This agreement didn't do that. Instead, it's nebulous wording that's very broad. But the wording is broad enough, and I'm assuming that the government will confirm that it precludes prosecuting Boeing for 364 counts of manslaughter, among other crimes mentioned in the crash.

Clearly, the victims' families represent victims of manslaughter crimes. And so at that point, that would be

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all the Court has to conclude. I don't think anything I've said so far involves a factual dispute. The Court can simply reach that ruling, and then move on to the remedy stages of the case.

Now, we have another argument, separate and independent from what I've just advanced, which we've identified as the risk argument; that Boeing's conspiracy of lies to the FAA produced risk to passengers and crew.

I think there's a simple way, again, to demonstrate that fact that wouldn't involve the Court in any factual disputes. You could rule this morning, if you were inclined to do so, in our favor on the risk argument.

And the way I want to present this argument is to take you to a particular place and a particular time. So let's go to 6:32 a.m. local time, on October 29th, 2018, aboard Lion Air, Flight 610, which is over the Java Sea with 189 passengers and crew.

At 6:32 a.m. local time, Boeing's MCAS system activated, driving the nose of that aircraft down toward the Java Sea. At that point in time, the crew was engaged in a life-or-death struggle to regain control of aircraft.

What do we know about that point in time? We know that nothing in Boeing's flight manual, the FCOM, Flight Crew Operations Manual, even mentioned MCAS substantively, let alone told the crew what they should do.

We also know that the crew had no training 2 whatsoever. They didn't know what they were up against. 3 So, at that point in time, again, your Honor could conclude that Boeing's crime created risk to the passengers and crew, 4 5 and risk would be a harm creating crime victim status. Let me take you to another point in time at 6 7 another place. 8:39 a.m. local time, March 10th, 2019, aboard Ethiopian Airlines, Flight 302, on the outskirts of 8 9 Addis Ababa with 157 passengers and crew on board. 10 Once again, the MCAS system improperly activated, driving the nose of that aircraft down. And shockingly, 11 12 this was four and a half months after exactly the same thing 13 had happened with the Lion Air flight. 14 And here again, and no dispute on these facts, the 15 Ethiopian authorities have issued an official report on 16 this, a flight manual did not tell the crew what they were 17 up against. They had no training whatsoever in how to deal with MCAS activation. 18 19 So, at that point, it cannot be reasonably disputed, with regard to both of those flights, Boeing's 2.0 21 crime created risk to the passengers and crew. 22 How do we know for sure that there was risk created? The government has admitted it. Take a look --23 2.4 for example, let's go right to the criminal information that 25 is on this Court's docket in this case.

Here's what the criminal information says: "Boeing 1 2 willfully conspired 'To defraud the U.S. by impairing, 3 obstructing, defeating, and interfering with, by dishonest means, 'a lawful function of the FAA AEG, "that is, 4 5 interfering with the safety regulators in this country. Here's the government's press release, handed out 6 7 a few minutes after they filed the DPA on your docket. is the government speaking in a press release. "The 8 9 misleading statements, half-truths, omissions communicated 10 by Boeing's employees to the FAA," here's the key language, "impeded the government's ability to ensure the safety of 11 12 the flying public." 13 So you would simply have to rely on statements 14 from the government. You could also look at the statements 15 of fact, paragraph 44, where Boeing and the government both 16 admitted that, as a result of Boeing's conspiracy crime, 17 MCAS was not in the flight crew manuals and the training that was available to those who were flying the 737. 18 19 Again, we think you could rule immediately, based 20 on undisputed facts, that the passengers and crew suffered 21 risk. 22 Let me be clear. The Crime Victims' Rights Act doesn't require you to find that a victim suffered physical 23 harm or financial harm. The only word that's used in there 2.4 25 is "harm."

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That's a broad term that can include the kind of risks that we're talking about this morning. And you could conclude that there was harm inflicted on them because they were placed on a -- in a riskier position.

So on any of those three arguments, we think the Court can rule immediately based on the existing record that the victims' families represent crash victims who were crime victims under the CVRA.

Because, you know, we have a fourth argument that may involve some disputed facts. I'm not really sure how many disputed facts it involved, but what I want to be clear here this morning is, in outlining these other arguments, which I think you could rule on immediately, it's not because we're in any way concerned that we could not prove what happened here.

The victims' families are ready, willing, and able to convincingly demonstrate, if you give us an evidentiary hearing, that Boeing's conspiracy of lies killed 346 innocent people. That's the stone cold truth of the matter, once the Court has all the facts in front of it.

And we filed -- this isn't lawyer hyperbole here. You've seen our 53-page proffer, single spaced, for the record, that lays out all of the facts that we would prove if we had an evidentiary hearing.

And we've also filed three expert reports at

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docket entry 76, one, two, three, again reinforcing that conclusion. We don't think you need expert assistance to reach the conclusion, but if the Court would like expert assistance, we've provided that as well.

So if for any reason you can't rule in our favor on the other arguments, then, at an absolute minimum, we're entitled to an evidentiary hearing where we will prove what is the truth in this case.

Now, what is the parties' response to our request for an evidentiary hearing? I mean, I think you've probably seen the same sentence or two that I've seen. No, they're not entitled to an evidentiary hearing, and then kind of move on from there.

But the government has conceded that you have inherent discovery power to investigate the facts of the situation in front of you to make appropriate rulings.

They cite, and we think this is the right case,
Natural Gas Pipeline vs. Energy Gathering, a Fifth Circuit
case from 1993. So you would gather the facts, give us an
opportunity to prove the direct and proximate connection
between Boeing's conspiracy of lies and the deaths of 346
people.

The Fifth Circuit has also said you have to do that. We've cited, again in our papers, I think the best case on this one is Fisher II, a case that I argued to the

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Fifth Circuit in 2011 that collected various cases where
Courts have been required to look beyond the charging
document and determine what the facts of the case were.

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And it's unsurprising that you might have to look beyond the charging document to make the crime victim determination.

In Fisher II, the Fifth Circuit said, look, if there's a disputed issue on who is a crime victim, the way the Court should proceed is to create a mental picture of the world without the defendant's crime. So that's going to inevitably require some fact-finding or some understanding of the facts of the case.

What you do in this case is you take out Boeing's two-year conspiracy of lies to the FAA, remove that fact, and then what does the world look like? We think the answer to that question is clear: 346 people would not have died in two crashes.

Now, at some points in their brief it seems like the government is suggesting, okay, you know, let's move on. Your Honor, you couldn't award any remedy so you don't have to decide whether the victims are crime victims under the CVRA.

That's just flat-out wrong, for this reason: We are here this morning asking for a determination that we possess, my -- the family members possess crime victim

1 status because that will have prospective meaning.

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The government has yet to confer with us about why they did this. If you were to rule this morning that these families are crime victims under the CVRA, we would immediately go to the government, and say, all right, we want to discuss this with you. We want to exercise our right to confer under the CVRA.

So the Court doesn't have, in our view, any option to avoid this issue because we want to know today whether they're protected under the CVRA so that we get all the rights that the CVRA provides.

But, in addition to prospective application, the CVRA is also going to have retrospective application here. And that's an obligation that's imposed on this Court by Congress in Section 3771(1)(b)(1) of the CVRA.

That's the provision -- you can see what Congress has tried to do here. That's the provision giving the CVRA meaning. It says, the Court shall "ensure that the crime victim is afforded the rights described in the CVRA."

Without that kind of enforcement mechanism, the CVRA would be meaningless. We would have the government doing what they did in this case, and say, oh, we're, sorry. See ya later.

You are obligated under the CVRA to ensure that these families have their rights under the CVRA. And the

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way to do that is to give them the right to confer with the government about the DPA. Wait a minute. The DPA says Boeing can never be prosecuted.

So the logical step in creating a remedy in this case is to remove those provisions from the DPA so that the victims' families can then meaningfully confer with the prosecutors at a time when their input could make a difference.

There's one case right on point for that very proposition. It's a case that I've argued the last ten years in front of Judge Marra down in the Southern District of Florida, the Jeffrey Epstein case.

And in the Epstein case the same thing happened. The government did a secret deal with a wealthy defendant, and then the victims learned about it later.

And so we went to Judge Marra and said, hey, we were never given the opportunity — the victims were never given the opportunity to confer with the prosecutors about this nonprosecution agreement, and you should give us that opportunity.

And Judge Marra agreed. He said, well, I'm going to need to do some fact-finding, but if you connect the facts here and show that you were crime victims, and that the government didn't confer with you properly, then I will set aside the provisions in the nonprosecution agreement.

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And this is what he said, I will set those aside "as a prelude to the full, unfettered exercise of the victims' conferral rights at a time that will enable the victims to exercise those rights meaningfully." The victims' families here want a chance to go to the government, when it's meaningful, and say, here's why you should prosecute Boeing. Here's the way you can do it. Here's the way we think the case should be handled. Let's be clear. Prosecutors do have discretion. We're not disputing that. They may end up disagreeing with the victims' families after that presentation is made.

The victims' families were promised by Congress that they would have an opportunity to go to those prosecutors and convince them to prosecute Boeing, and that never happened in this case. And this Court must ensure that it happens. That's one of the remedies available.

We would also call to your Honor's attention, we were pleased to see, just this last week, Senator Cruz, who has been involved in drafting the CVRA, filing an amicus brief urging this Court to take a careful look at the kind of remedies that would be available, and he listed some possibilities as well.

So for all those reasons, we would ask the Court to conclude that the victims' families are here representing crash victims who are crime victims under the CVRA.

So that's our -- I don't want to tread on the 1 2 Court's patience too much, but that's our first motion. With the Court's permission, I would move on then 3 to our second motion, which I think is related. 4 5 All right. So the second motion is what I will refer to as the disclosure of information motion. 6 7 Let's assume, we've tried to lay out some ways in which the Court could avoid time-consuming or complicated 8 9 fact-finding, but if you think fact-finding is appropriate 10 in this case, then our next motion, motion for disclosure of information, rests on a simple premise: If the Court is 11 12 going to make factual findings, it should have the relevant information. 13 14 And remarkably, the government seems to disagree 15 with that. They seem to think that they can sit on 16 literally millions of pages of documents, as you know from 17 some other litigation you've been involved with, that would help us prove our case. 18 19 And then they want you to conclude, oh, the 2.0 victims' families aren't really victims here. Well, they 21 have information in their files that would prove that very 22 point. 23 Now, that position strikes me as not only 2.4 violating fundamental precepts of human decency, but also 2.5 violating common sense, and particularly important for this

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1 morning, violating the CVRA.

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I've just mentioned that you have an obligation under the CVRA to ensure that the crime victim is afforded the rights under the CVRA.

Well, how can you do that if you don't have all the facts in front of you? You have inherent power to order discovery. You have the obligation to ensure that the victims' rights were protected, and neither Boeing nor the government mentioned that provision in their briefs.

So I would take it that's an undisputed point that's part of ensuring the crime victims' rights, protections of the victims' families, you would look at all the information.

In addition to that, the CVRA, perhaps anticipating recalcitrant prosecutors, have directed that the Justice Department shall, "Make its best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of and afforded the rights described in the CVRA."

How can the Justice Department make its best efforts to enforce the CVRA when it's withholding information that would help the victims prove their point? And we've cited some authorities that we think lead to that conclusion.

Your Honor is well familiar with the Brady Rule.

If my clients had committed a murder or something like that,

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the government would have to give them lots of information. 1 But the victims' families are innocent victims 2 3 trying to protect statutorily created rights, and the government is taking up the position that they don't have to 4 turn over information. 5 Although it's curious, the government says, "We 6 7 agree" -- this is a quote from their brief, "The government forthrightly acknowledges that the victims' families deserve 8 to be treated with fairness." 9 10 How can it possibly be fair for the government to withhold information that is directly on point for the 11 12 factual issues that are before this Court? 13 And in addition, as your Honor is well aware, and 14 I'm sure the government attorneys are well aware, there are 15 duties of candor to the Court. We laid that out in our 16 brief. The government didn't explain how they were going to 17 discharge their candor-to-the-Court obligation while they're withholding information. 18 19 So we think if your Honor reaches issues that involve factual disputes, you would simply enter an order to 2.0 21 the government requiring them -- we've spelled out the kinds 22 of information we're looking for. 23 We're not seeking to rummage through their files. 2.4 We have particular points of interest, and they could turn 2.5 over the information on those points of interest. So that's

our second motion which you should grant, in our view, if 1 2 the Crime Victims Rights victim status is disputed. So now we have -- again, with the Court's 3 permission, I would move on to our third motion, which we've 4 5 identified as the supervisory power motion. And let me sort of break the argument here into two pieces. 6 7 What parts of the DPA should you be examining closely or supervise? And then, if there are aspects that 8 9 should be examined closely, does the Court have the 10 authority to do that? So the first point, what should you be 11 12 scrutinizing? Well, there's an astonishing provision in the 13 DPA that says, "The following senior management had nothing 14 to do with the crimes." It's one sentence that's in there. 15 Whv? 16 There's no explanation for why they would put that 17 in there. They don't ordinarily do that. I'm assuming that the government confirmed that they didn't put senior 18 19 management under oath before reaching that conclusion. So 20 what is going on with that provision? 21 What is going on with the rest of the DPA? 22 were just discussing, does it cover manslaughter or not? Ordinarily, the government is very precise about which 23 2.4 crimes are covered and which defendants are being protected 25 from prosecution. Not in this case.

And that would be something that I think may inevitably embroil the Court in disputes. So you should supervise the DPA right now and ask the government, what crimes are covered and what people are covered? That doesn't seem like an unreasonable proposition.

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In addition to that, as I've just explained, the government seems to concede they have not consulted with the victims before entering into this DPA.

If your Honor has supervisory power, one of the things you could say is, I'm going to supervise these proceedings and at least make sure that these families have an opportunity to talk to you before you put a DPA on my docket and expect me to sign off on it.

None of that information, by the way, was disclosed to your Honor when the DPA was filed. They never told you anything about failure to consult with the victims.

And finally, we were pleased to see, again,

Senator Cruz filed an amicus brief last week explaining that
he thinks there are some aspects of this case that need to
be supervised and scrutinized very carefully.

One of the things that Senator Cruz highlighted, that I hadn't really thought about before was, we have Boeing sending reports over to the government every three months about how they've supposedly cleaned up their act. That would be great, if they've cleaned up their act.

1 But why is that process happening secretly, without the victims' families or the public able to see 2 3 what's being transmitted between the government and Boeing? 4 There's no explanation for why that has to be done secretly. I think Senator Cruz has asked you to take a good 5 look at that provision. 6 7 And perhaps maybe there are some commercial trade secrets or some items, as part of the disclosure, that would 8 9 have to be redacted or something, but why can't the rest of 10 that process be done publicly and transparently? So those are the aspects of the DPA that we think should be 11 12 scrutinized carefully. The next question is, all right, do you have the 13 14 authority to scrutinize the DPA carefully? The answer is 15 yes. The Speedy Trial Act very clearly gives this Court authority to scrutinize these kinds of agreements and we've 16 17 cited the relevant provision in our briefs. It's 3161(h)(2). 18 19 And it says that the government can execute a DPA "pursuant to a written agreement with the defendant, with 20 21 the approval of the Court." 22 So there's that language, "with the approval of 23 the Court." This is 3161(h)(2). 3161(h)(2)., "Pursuant to 2.4 a written agreement with the defendant, with the approval of the Court." 25

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So now there's that language "with the approval of 1 2 the Court." The question then becomes, what is "with the 3 approval of the Court" referring to? 4 And here we rely on the Scalia/Garner treatise on statutory construction, which we think has the relevant 5 canon of construction. You would use what they refer to as 6 7 the nearest-reasonable-referent rule. "With approval of the Court" refers to what? 8 Written agreement. So the question then becomes whether 9 10 this Court would approve the written agreement. Now, what's interesting -- that's our argument we 11 12 laid out in our briefs. And what did the government say? 13 They didn't even cite that provision in their response, much 14 less dispute our interpretation of that provision. So we 15 think you have essentially undisputed argument on that 16 point. 17 Unless you want to let Boeing jump into the fray here. Boeing says, well, wait a minute. There's some cases 18 19 here that we think indicate that your Honor should not be 20 scrutinizing this agreement carefully. 21 They cite Fokker Services, the D.C. Circuit case 22 from 2016, but that case was in a very unusual factual 23 posture. In that case, the district court judge said, hey, 2.4 I'm disagreeing with what the prosecutors are doing here. 25 They should have filed different charges.

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It goes up to the D.C. Circuit, which says, wait a minute. You can't decide which charges should be filed. Of course, we're not making that argument here. We're making the argument we want to discuss with the prosecutors what charges to be filed, acknowledging that they ultimately have discretion which charge they would finally file.

So we are in a totally different posture here.

But in addition to that, Fokker rested on D.C. Circuit

precedent which said that, in the D.C. Circuit, trial court

judges cannot reject a plea bargain because they're too

lenient. That's obviously the law of the circuit there in

the D.C. Circuit.

In this circuit, the law is different. In this circuit, and we've cited four cases: Bean, Miles, Merritt, and Cheever. The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that you can look at a plea agreement, and say, hey, this is just too lenient. I'm not going to sign off on it.

Against that premise, Fokker is not controlling, because it doesn't rely on Fifth Circuit law which is contrary to the premise that they have there. We've also noted that the Court would have some inherent power in its docket as well to look over this.

It's interesting when you hear what the government is trying to present to you this morning. They're saying, oh, you don't have authority to do this. They have, for

decades, taken a different position.

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And we've cited, I think, an excellent article that I would call to your attention. This is from Professor Peter Reilly, who's right here at Texas A&M Law School, published in, I'm proud to say, the Utah Law Review.

And that article collects a number of examples of the government saying, of course the Court can reject a DPA, just as it can reject a plea bargain or other types of agreements.

So maybe the government, when they stand up today, they can discuss this issue in their briefs, but they can explain why they're taking a different position in front of you than they've historically taken for, I think, several decades to the contrary.

And likewise, Senator Cruz's amicus brief, once again, I think, highlights the fact that this Court would have authority to understand the principles of inherent power to review a document that's been put onto its docket, to review an agreement that requires, you know, approval, to make a determination of whether that's appropriate. So we'd ask you to rule in our favor on that motion as well.

Again, I hope I'm not treading on the Court's patience here, but I would like to then move to our --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. CASSELL: -- our fourth motion is what I would

call the arraignment and conditions-of-release motion. And 1 2 it rests on a simple premise. I was standing in the hall 3 this morning watching defendants in shackles going down, I think to your magistrate judge, I think for an arraignment. 4 It looked to me like some of them didn't have as 5 many attorneys as Boeing has here this morning. That's what 6 7 they had to do. But Boeing comes with a team of lawyers, and with the agreement of the government, and avoids going 8 9 to a public arraignment like every other criminal defendant 10 in America. That's not right. And that violates the law. It violates Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11 10(a), which says, "An arraignment must be conducted in open 12 court." 13 14 I mean, I think I could almost sit down at this point because the plain language of the rule says "must be 15 conducted." So our position is simple: You must conduct an 16 17 arraignment of Boeing, and it must be done in open court. Now, what does the government say about this? 18 19 I've read their brief four or five times. I can't quite 2.0 tell what they're saying, because they never come out and 21 directly say what they mean. 22 I think, and it will be interesting to hear what 23 they say this morning, are they agreeing that Rule 10(a) requires an arraignment? 2.4 25 There are passages in their brief that seem to say

that, but then they say, well, it doesn't appear that it 1 2 happens within any particular time. It's true that 3 Rule 10(a) doesn't say you have to do it within 14 days or 4 something, but clearly there would be a rule of 5 reasonableness. At some point, the arraignment has to be 6 held. 7 We've cited Rule 2 which says that the federal rules must be interpreted to eliminate "unjustifiable 8 9 delav." 10 At this point, we've had Boeing not arraigned for That's without any justification. That is, by 11 12 definition, unjustifiable delay. 13 So then the only remaining question is is the 14 victims' position correct on how to interpret Rule 10(a)? 15 It's interesting, the government cited the Wright and Miller 16 Treatise, a very well-regarded treatise. 17 When you look at the treatise, the treatise says that the rule "Does not authorize the defendant to waive the 18 19 arraignment itself." So even the government's own source, 20 Wright and Miller, says you can't waive the arraignment. 21 What is Boeing's position? Boeing's position is, 22 okay, that language, yeah, it's mandatory language. All it 23 means is, if you have an arraignment, it has to be in open 2.4 court, but that's not what the rule says. The rule says

must be conducted in court, " an arraignment.

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It's interesting they cite the rules on jury 1 2 trials. And they say, look, you don't always have to have a 3 jury trial and that's true. 4 When you look at Rule 23 in the federal rules, here's what it says, "If the defendant is entitled to a jury 5 trial, then the trial must be in front of a jury," so on and 6 7 so forth." That's not the way Congress ruled -- I'm sorry, 8 the courts wrote in 10(a)., they said there must be an 9 10 arraignment conducted. That's in Rule 10(a). 11 If you go to the adjacent position in 10(b), 10(b) 12 says the defendant can waive their appearance at the 13 arraignment, but only in certain unique circumstances that 14 aren't present here. 15 And then, if you go from Rule 10(b) to the advisory committee notes under 10(b), it says that, "It's 16 17 important to note that this rule does not permit the defendant to waive the arraignment itself which may be a 18 19 triggering mechanism for other rules." 20 As your Honor is well aware, when somebody is 21 arraigned, then what happens? Okay. We have to figure out 22 what are the conditions of release? Don't have a firearm. 23 Don't talk to victims. Don't commit any new crimes. 2.4 Boeing has connived to get out of all those 25 standard conditions that other defendants walking in the

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courthouse this morning are going to have imposed on them once criminal charges have been filed.

If there were any doubt on this point, again, we have Fifth Circuit authority right on point, U.S. vs. Moore, Fifth Circuit, 1994, discussing the issue of whether -- this is just whether the defendant can sign the waiver of indictment form ahead of time.

And the Fifth Circuit says, well, it's okay to sign the form ahead of time, but in the interest of transparent justice and everyone understanding what's going on, the defendant has to acknowledge that signature in open court.

So we think there's no doubt that this Court has to arraign Boeing. And the government says, okay, but, you know, it's not going to make any difference to anything.

That's simply untrue.

Because once Boeing is arraigned, as a standard condition of release, this Court will impose, under 3142(c), that Boeing shall not commit any new crimes.

Now, where does that become significant? Because if Boeing were to commit new crimes, then your Honor would have the ability, as you know from supervised release and other violations that you routinely handle, to say, wait a minute. I better put some additional conditions here to make sure the public is protected.

You've been deprived of that power because of this 1 2 maneuver between Boeing and the government, because they 3 said, we've engineered all this in our own little private 4 agreement. That's not the way the rules work. That's not 5 the way the criminal justice system in this country works, and Boeing should be subject to the same rules as everyone 6 7 else. So you should hold an arraignment. And at that 8 arraignment, by the way, the victims would have a right to 9 10 be heard on conditions of release. I can tell you that some of my victims' families will come in and explain to you 11 12 appropriate conditions that they think should be placed on 13 Boeing so you could have that information as part of your 14 decision-making process. Again, the victims' families 15 understand the final decision will be up to you. 16 But what's happened in this case is the ordinary 17 rules that apply in any other criminal case have been circumvented and they've been deprived of that opportunity. 18 19 So we would ask you to grant our fourth motion for that 2.0 reason as well. 21 THE COURT: Very good. Let me ask you a few 22 questions. 23 MR. CASSELL: Yeah. 2.4 THE COURT: And first, just kind of a basic 25 question that maybe you can help me with, but you talked

Epstein, done in secret. Victims find out. My colleague

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Case <u>4:21-cr-00005-O Document</u> 95 Filed 05/12/22 Page 36 of 189 PageID 1140 36 Brad Edwards and I filed similar motions to what you see 1 2 here, saying, wait a minute. You have to confer with the 3 victims. 4 The government says, well, we don't think we had any obligation to confer. So we reject -- you know, we 5 oppose your motions. 6 7 And Judge Marra said, well, wait a minute. I got to figure out what the facts are. Did you confer? Did you 8 9 not? How did it work? He said, I am the inherent 10 fact-finding authority. I'm going to order some fact-finding. 11 12 So he ordered fact-finding in I believe it was 13 2011. So the day before the government is supposed to 14 produce its facts, it files a motion to dismiss. You can't 15 award a remedy, Judge. You shouldn't do fact-finding 16 17

because there's never going to be a remedy at the end of the day. We say, oh, yes, there's going to be a remedy at the end of the day, advancing arguments similar to the ones I just advanced to you.

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And in 2013, Judge Marra ruled that the victims have identified a meaningful remedy, setting aside the pieces of a nonprosecution agreement, blocking Epstein's prosecution as a prelude to the unfettered exercise of the conferral rights. That was 2013.

Epstein goes up to the Eleventh Circuit in 2014,

says, wait a minute. There's a plea bargaining privilege.

You can't look at the documents. Eleventh Circuit rejects

it. Back down to Judge Marra.

Then we got our discovery from the government. We

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file, in 2015, a motion for summary judgment that the CVRA has been violated. And in 2019, Judge Marra rules in our favor, granting summary judgment. The government failed to confer with the victims, cites In re Dean, and some other cases I'm citing here today, saying you had to confer with the victims. So that was in February of 2019.

And he says, now that I've determined that there's been a violation of the CVRA, now I want to know what the remedies are. So he directs briefing on remedies. So we file briefs, Epstein files briefs, government files briefs. I thought we had some great briefs in there.

And then Jeffrey Epstein was arrested in July of 2019 and committed suicide, apparently, in August of 2019.

And at that point, in September of 2019, Judge Marra says, well, Epstein is dead. So sorry, Professor Cassell, you've been here 10 years, but I can't do anything for you. Throws the case out as moot.

We then go up to the Eleventh Circuit saying the case is not moot, because we are also seeking invalidation of the co-conspirator immunity provision in the NPA,

Ghislaine Maxwell, and others. So the case isn't moot with

respect to that.

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So we filed our brief on that. And then the government comes in, and says, that's all very interesting, but we don't think the CVRA applied in this case because we never filed charges. This was a nonprosecution agreement. There were some state proceedings, but there was never a federal docket entry, never a federal charge in this case.

And, in fact, our CVRA case was opened up under the court's civil docketing authority in Case No. 123, civil number.

So they make that argument. They win 2-1 in front of the Eleventh Circuit. We then get the hearing en banc, and we lose 8-5 in the Eleventh Circuit en banc on that issue.

Now, as you know from our briefs, the Eleventh Circuit dropped footnotes in both the panel and the en banc decision, saying, look, we're not reaching some other issues here, like what would happen if the victims came in to an ongoing criminal case, see In re Dean.

So the Eleventh Circuit was trying to avoid a circuit split by saying, we're not disagreeing with what In re Dean said. We're just saying, whenever there's not a federal charged filed, then you don't have a right to go into court.

We go to the Supreme Court. They deny the

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circuit. The key point of all that is the Eleventh Circuit en banc, which the footnote cited in our brief, specifically says we are not contradicting In re Dean.

Of course, if you were to look at the Eleventh Circuit precedent, you have to give more weight to the Fifth Circuit precedent that's controlling here.

THE COURT: Let me ask you about setting aside the provisions. In this circuit, a plea agreement, I can reject a plea agreement because it undermines the purposes of sentencing or the guidelines or -- as long as I'm specific in why I'm rejecting the plea agreement, I can do that.

But I don't understand that I can weigh in and say specifically what I think it should be, then I will be reversed, mandamused, reversed, and the case would be reassigned from me.

And so when you say that I should look at this DPA and say the senior management shouldn't be in here or amount paid into the fund should be higher or whatever, why would I look at this different than I would a plea agreement?

MR. CASSELL: So we think you would look at it the same way. Let me see if I can unpack what the examination would look like. So remember, we have two objections that are to the DPA. One is procedural. You could look at that and say, well, my goodness, you haven't conferred with the victims. I'm not going to approve the agreement until you

have meaningful conferral with the victims. 1 2 And that wouldn't require you to second-guess 3 anything about any of the provisions in the DPA, the 4 procedural point. 5 We think, in addition, and I think Senator Cruz also agrees with us on this point, that you have an ability 6 7 to substantively look at those provisions. You could say there's an exoneration provision for senior management. 8 9 That's very unusual. I don't see any justification for 10 that. I don't see any support for that. I have questions about that. So I'm not going to approve the agreement based 11 12 on what I'm seeing here today. I want some more information 13 on that. 14 Or another provision, the government has trumpeted in its press release, we got 2.5 billion out of Boeing. 15 16 That's a misleading statement. Boeing was obligated to pay 17 a majority of that money contractually, but the government wanted to take credit for it. 18 19 You could look at that and say, this looks 2.0 misleading. I have questions about it. I'm rejecting the 21 agreement because it doesn't seem to be explained here 22 what's going on. 23 I think that would be the type of thing you would

do with a plea agreement. Say, look, I have questions here.

I see that I'm stipulating to some facts or some things that

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1 aren't covered. Can you all go back and take a look at 2 those issues? 3 They might come back and say, well, here's the same thing or a little more explanation. So we're not 4 5 asking you to do a red line of the DPA or something like that. We're asking you to simply reject the provisions 6 7 we've identified for the reasons I've identified. THE COURT: So would I reject the provisions or 8 9 would I reject the agreement as a whole? 10 MR. CASSELL: You would reject -- you could do 11 either. I would think you would reject the agreement based 12 on the provisions that were problematic. THE COURT: Okay. 13 14 MR. CASSELL: And then ask the parties to come back in front of you. By the way, if you did that, that 15 16 then, presumably, we would hope, as part of your order, you 17 would order the government to confer with the victims, and then that would take care of the procedural piece as well. 18 19 THE COURT: Right. Right. If I were to say, \$500,000,000 into this victims' 2.0 21 fund -- I think \$500,000,000 into this victim fund is 22 inadequate, it would then be improper for me to say -- would it be improper for me to say, if I have an evidentiary 23 2.4 hearing and you were able to establish that \$1,000,000 is 25 appropriate, would it be improper for me to say \$500,000,000

too low. I'm rejecting this agreement. You all come back

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Case <u>4:21-cr-00005-O Document 95 Filed 05/12/22 Page 43 of 189 PageID 1147 43</u> 1 with something else. 2 THE COURT: I see. Okay. 3 MR. CASSELL: It's that formulation we would ask 4 you to adopt. 5 THE COURT: Okav. Very good. Let me ask you another question while you're here. 6 7 Explain to me your take on the In re Dean case, because the 8 In re Dean case actually denies mandamus relief. 9 And so the three elements -- they talk about the 10 three elements that you had to prove to get mandamus relief. They don't address the first two elements because they 11 12 decide under the prudential element, the third element, that 13 under the unique circumstances of that fact pattern, they 14 were going to deny a mandamus writ. So why don't you just 15 explain to me your take-away --16 MR. CASSELL: Sure. 17 THE COURT: I mean, I've read the case. I understand the facts. 18 19 MR. CASSELL: Yes. 2.0 THE COURT: And I've read the underlying opinion. 21 MR. CASSELL: Yes. 22 THE COURT: Judge Rosenthal's opinion as well. 23 MR. CASSELL: Yes. 2.4 THE COURT: It's a very long, detailed opinion. 25 MR. CASSELL: Sure.

THE COURT: Okay.

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review.

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MR. CASSELL: I think that's one thing that needs to be taken off the table. Today these families are entitled to the same appellate protection as any other litigant would have.

Back then we were working under mandamus which, as you know, has the three prongs and it's difficult to satisfy.

So the Fifth Circuit sends it back to Judge
Rosenthal. Big, long, evidentiary hearing, 120-page
opinion, as Judge Rosenthal is famous for writing, rejecting
our argument that she would have done anything different if
there had been an opportunity to present to the judge.

In that case, we were arguing that there had been no opportunity to be heard on the plea bargain before it was accepted. And so Judge Rosenthal said, well, you know, I've looked at this, and here's some reasons why this is a good outcome and so forth.

So that case, it's quite -- and the other thing

I'm sure you recall reading in the In re Dean decision, I

think it's the last paragraph, the Fifth Circuit says, we

are confident that the district court judge will figure out

a way to vindicate the rights of the victims.

And what happened in that case is the victims did get a chance to come into court, did get a chance to present to the judge, make the objections to the plea bargain so

agreement with British Petroleum. They reached the

THE COURT: That's granted. They reached a plea

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agreement with British Petroleum, then file it, then unseal 1 2 it, and then provide the notice, and then you all get 3 involved. 4 MR. CASSELL: Yes. 5 THE COURT: And the case ultimately gets assigned to Judge Rosenthal, and then she issues an order either 6 7 saying they weren't victims or saying they were victims. But she would do the same thing, all that she says, you take 8 9 it up to the circuit, the circuit says they're victims. It 10 shouldn't be sealed. 200 is not too many to notify. This is what Congress intended, even if it does 11 12 make bargaining harder. In fact, the purpose is to make 13 bargaining harder. 14 MR. CASSELL: Right. Yes. THE COURT: And then they deny mandamus relief and 15 16 say they're confident that Judge Rosenthal will vindicate 17 the rights. But they don't order the plea bargain agreement to be set aside so that those victims could then meet with 18 19 the prosecutors and express their views on it. 2.0 Are you saying that that subsequently happened 21 with Judge Rosenthal on remand? 22 MR. CASSELL: So I remember that there was a big 23 hearing that produced then a 120-page opinion about our 2.4 arguments and why, in Judge Rosenthal's view, they were not

sufficient to change the outcome. So we were heard.

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1 argued to Judge Rosenthal on remand.

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And so my recollection is that our focus in that case was not on a conferral right. Although, actually I think we were focusing more on the plea agreement, trying to get that set aside than we were on conferral, because we had a done plea deal in that case.

THE COURT: Right. And that's what I was wondering in terms of how it applies to this case. The Fifth Circuit didn't direct that the plea agreement be set aside, at least in the opinion, that it specified in the opinion. It may have. And what I'm saying is it could have happened on remand. It sounds like it didn't.

MR. CASSELL: Right.

THE COURT: And as it relates to this case, in terms of how In re Dean would apply in this case, why would I set the agreement aside consistent with what In re Dean directed?

MR. CASSELL: Right. And the answer is because we are asking for an opportunity to confer about an agreement before it becomes finalized.

Whereas, in Dean, we were asking to have the agreement itself set aside. I think it's interesting, I keep coming back to Judge Marra's decision because I think it's the one that's on point and it discusses the very question that you're asking right now.

And what Judge Marra said and, you know, frankly, 1 2 perhaps our arguments were more refined in 2013, my 3 arguments were better presented in 2013 than they were in 2008. 4 5 In 2013 we said to the judge, look, the CVRA promises these victims an opportunity to have reasonable --6 a reasonable right to confer. 7 And that must be a meaningful right to confer. So 8 if you say, come on in to the prosecutor's office, and it's 9 10 still a done deal, that's window dressing. That's going to 11 add insult to injury. 12 The only way I can protect the right to 13 meaningfully confer is to set aside those provisions and 14 give the victims an opportunity to go in and convince the 15 prosecutors to do the right thing. 16 He cites In re Dean. He actually cites one of 17 Judge Rosenthal's -- I can't remember if it was the earlier one or later one. So he was very much aware of the Fifth 18 19 Circuit precedent trying to align himself with what the 20 Fifth Circuit precedent required. 21 The other point to be made about the Fifth Circuit 22 is they were trying to clean up a mess. They were trying to 23 clean up a violation of CVRA that had already occurred and 2.4 that the district judge had essentially ratified and they 25 had to step in on appeal and I think we're --

of it in this context, but I don't take this. I don't get 1 2 deferred prosecution agreements. 3 MR. CASSELL: Right. THE COURT: Which really hurt my feelings here. 4 5 When you wonder why, in footnote six, they wouldn't file in 6 the Fort Worth Division. What division would be better? 7 MR. CASSELL: The reputation of this Division precedes itself. That's clearly the highest quality of 8 9 justice. And that's why my clients are very confident that 10 they're going to get a favorable outcome here shortly. THE COURT: Okay. Just the last question, and 11 12 then we need to hear from the government and from Boeing, 13 but the last question I have is the senior management 14 argument. 15 So is it your take that the statement in the 16 statement of facts or the DPA, wherever it is, that says 17 that the senior management of Boeing, I would have to look at the quote, but there's no evidence that senior 18 19 management -- this has persisted among the senior management 20 at Boeing, or whatever they said. 21 So your take on that is they've been immunized or 22 that the government has agreed to not prosecute them based upon that line? 23 2.4 MR. CASSELL: Essentially, yes. But it's a very 25 unusual provision. We've cited some commentators who said

they've never seen anything like this around the country.

So I don't want to overstate our case.

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That's not an immunity provision. I'm using the term loosely. It's not a provision that says, we are flatly precluded from prosecuting senior management. But you can imagine what a jury trial would look like if they tried — if a prosecutor tried to prosecute senior management.

Defense Exhibit 1 would be that statement and the case would be over. So it effectively prevented the prosecution of senior management, which is why I'm sure Boeing was pushing so hard to get that provision in there.

And why it's just so surprising that the government would do that, without, as far as we understand it, putting senior management under oath and asking them, were you involved in this crime?

I mean, if they had done that, they said, well, okay, that seems like a reasonable explanation, I suppose you can do that. But they just threw that in there, without precedent and without investigation, and we think that that's a provision that deserves careful scrutiny from this Court.

THE COURT: Last question, and I promise. The Supreme Court recently, at least twice this term, has cautioned judges, district judges to not impose remedies in cases where the statutory language does not authorize that.

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                SB 8, the employment case announced last week or
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      two weeks ago.
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                MR. CASSELL: Right.
                THE COURT: It was a 6-3 decision.
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                Is that admonition at play here as it relates
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      to 3771?
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                MR. CASSELL: No, for a couple of reasons. First,
      the CVRA itself directs you to ensure that victims' rights
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      are respected. And so the victims' right to confer was not
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      respected in this case. Your Honor is obligated to enforce
      that. And the way you do that is by setting aside the
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      provisions in the DPA, reopening them.
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                By the way, here again, Judge Marra has looked at
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      that very question and reached the same conclusion that we
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      are arguing for. The government made an argument similar to
      what you just presented as a possibility and Judge Marra
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      rejected it.
                One of the provisions he looked at, if I could
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      call your attention to it, it's 3771. It's 3771(d)(5). And
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      you notice there, there was a time limit of 14 days if a
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      victim's family is moving to reopen a sentencing or a plea,
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      14-day time limit.
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                But we're not moving to reopen a sentence,
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      obviously, and we're not moving to reopen a plea. We're
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      trying to get Boeing to have to plead guilty or not guilty
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in an arraignment.

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So the 14 days doesn't apply. I think the parties really haven't contested that, but the implication there is, okay, reopening of agreements is permitted. And here's someone we're going to have put a 14-day time limit on, and the others we are not putting a time limit on. That's exactly what Judge Marra said, looking at this. The CVRA does envision this.

If you were to rule to the contrary, you would be violating the CVRA. You would be telling these families, look, you didn't get a right to confer, but, hey, when we wrote this thing, Congress wrote this thing back in 2004, they didn't really want to have enforceable rights.

That was contrary to the very purpose of the CVRA. It was designed to give family members like this enforceable rights where judges like you could tell the prosecutors they have to confer. Any other conclusion guts the CVRA and makes it meaningless. Oh, we will be nice to crime victims when it's convenient to everybody, but otherwise, don't bother us.

So that's why we think that that line of precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court is completely applicable. The CVRA itself, textually, makes very clear that these families -- and another provision, by the way -- well, first (c) (1) says the government has to make its best efforts to

1 enforce the rights during the investigation. 2 But the provision I was thinking of was (d)(3). 3 (d)(3), which is the enforcement provision that Congress put in there. "The rights described will be asserted in the 4 district court in which the defendant is being prosecuted." 5 So that's the Northern Division in the Northern 6 7 District of Texas. And it says that the victims can file motions and the Court takes up and decides them. That's 8 9 what we've done here. We've filed motions saying enforce 10 our right to confer. That's properly in front of you under the text of the CVRA. 11 12 We hope that you will grant our motion, set aside 13 the provisions that are preventing them from conferring and 14 give them an opportunity to convince the government to do the appropriate thing here, which is hold Boeing criminally 15 accountable for its crimes. 16 17 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. MR. DUFFY: Thank you, your Honor. Good morning. 18 19 Jerrob Duffy for the United States. 20 Your Honor, the United States recognizes the 21 immeasurable losses suffered by the representatives of the 22 crash victims of Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines 23 Flight 302. Nothing will ever make up for those losses. 2.4 The discrete legal issue to be decided here, your

Honor, is whether the movants are crime victims under the

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definition set forth in the CVRA with respect to the crime charged in the information.

The crime charged is a violation of 18 U.S.C. 371, conspiracy to defraud the United States. Specifically, the FAA AEG. And your Honor, of course, heard the evidence in the trial about a month ago. I won't go over all the evidence there but I will, in a moment, discuss some of that.

For the reasons set forth in our brief and that I will expand upon, the movants are not crime victims of the crime charged under the terms of the statute because they were not directly and proximately harmed by the charged offense.

This does not mean that they are not victims of the crashes or that, under a civil negligence, or some other standard, that they did not suffer losses with respect to the crashes. They surely did.

But the criminal case charged in the information and defined by the statements of facts set forth in the DPA do not encompass all of the facts and circumstances that led up to the crashes: the design of the planes, the issues related to information about MCAS that was disclosed to the FAA on multiple occasions by Boeing engineers, the role of foreign regulators, of the design issues and equipment and other failures related to the crashes. They cannot, because

the government is and was constrained to investigate 2 potential criminal conduct using evidence that is reliable, that can be admitted in federal court under the rules of 3 4 evidence, and be sponsored by federal prosecutors. 5 For any crime to be charged after these determinations, the Attorney General and his designees must 6 7 then exercise prosecutorial diversion, whether such a charge, even when they believe it can be proved with 8 9 admissible evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, should be 10 brought. Here, the criminal case is much more narrow than 11 12 movants have argued. In fact, the Court heard the evidence -- almost all of the evidence set forth in the DPA. 13 14 The Court heard that evidence during the trial against 15 Mr. Forkner. It took approximately three days. 16 The criminal case is defined by the charge set 17 forth in the information and is based on the facts as admitted by Boeing and in the DPA statement of facts. 18 19 The criminal charge and facts that underpin that 2.0 charge do not establish that movants are crime victims under 21 the CVRA. 22 Further, your Honor, because the remedies sought here by the movants are not available under the CVRA or were 23 2.4 not warranted, the motions should be denied. 25 Nonetheless, your Honor, as set forth in our

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brief, the government apologizes for not meeting and conferring with the crash victims' beneficiaries before entering into the DPA, even though it did not have a legal obligation to do so.

Even if such consultations would not have changed the DPA, there is a chance that earlier consultation would have provided these individuals with a chance to be heard with respect to the case.

After the filing of these motions, the government did meet with some of the movants on three occasions, the third of which involved the Attorney General for the United States.

The Department of Justice has committed and has set forth in our filing to learn from this and other cases when determining what revisions to its internal policies, guidelines, and practices are warranted.

None of this, however, means that the DPA was negotiated in violation of the CVRA. It was not. Under the definition set forth in the CVRA, the movants are not crime victims with respect to the charge, of 18 U.S.C. 371, conspiracy to defraud the United States.

Your Honor, the government carefully investigated and weighed the potential charges it could bring in this case against Boeing and believed it could prove beyond a reasonable doubt in federal court.

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The evidence collected during the investigation established, in the view of the prosecution, that only two conspirators, the two who are described in the statement of facts, were criminal participants in this conspiracy.

Let me reiterate that. The government's evidence was that only two conspirators were criminal participants in the charged conspiracy. Boeing Employee Number One, who's been publicly identified by the United States in its charging instrument as Mr. Forkner, and Boeing Employee Number Two, another pilot who was, during most of the charged conspiracy, more junior to Mr. Forkner, and who later acceded to his — the role of chief technical pilot.

Those individuals are described in the statement of facts. This is important for many reasons with respect to the CVRA analysis. Because the case, the criminal case, the case that the United States believed, and ultimately did bring in terms of the filed charged information was not and did not encompass all of the events that have been publicly described or that have been described by movants with respect to the factors that led to the crashes.

Based on this assessment of the evidence, the government prosecutors, supervisors, and senior officials believe that the filed information, combined with the DPA, was appropriate at the time this case was filed on January 7th of 2021. The government's position remains that

it was appropriate.

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The government's litigation position has not improved over the past 16 months. As the Court well knows, Mr. Forkner was acquitted on four counts of wire fraud, a different charge, admittedly, than the charge set forth in the information, but nonetheless involving almost all of the same evidence.

Further, your Honor, with respect to the charged offense, these two conspirators were relatively siloed within Boeing. They were not informed by others in Boeing about the expansion of MCAS at the time the expansion occurred before coming upon it in a simulator test in approximately November of 2016. They were not informed internally.

They were not invited to the meetings that the Court heard about with respect to Boeing engineers describing and disclosing the expansion of MCAS to the portion of the FAA that focuses on airworthiness and safety.

And other than the evidence that the Court heard from Mr. Loffing, the government did not come across credible evidence that Mr. Forkner or Boeing Employee Number Two were provided affirmatively with information about the expansion of MCAS or the other technical issues that later came to light with respect to MCAS.

And these are important implications because, with

respect to the criminal conduct that the United States 1 believed it could prove beyond a reasonable doubt, it is 2 3 cabined by the facts it was able to gather and, your Honor, 4 that were set forth in the deferred prosecution agreement. 5 And now I would like to talk for a moment about proximate cause as it relates to this. One moment. Your 6 7 Honor, to be considered a crime victim, a person or entity must be directly and proximately harmed as a result of the 8 9 charged criminal offense. 10 These are two separate determinations. As was 11 described earlier and set forth in the government's brief, 12 in Fisher the stated harm -- the Court held that stated harm 13 must be based on the crime charged. 14 And most importantly, we think, as cited in 15 Fisher, the Sixth Circuit In re McNulty described the 16 factual basement premise for how to arrive at this 17 determination. Because, again, we are living in a criminal -- a 18 19

criminal case context. A case where evidence has to be collected in accordance with the rules and that the prosecution can introduce into a criminal trial.

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In In re McNulty, 597 F.3d at 351, the Court described, "In making this determination we must, one, look to the offense of the conviction based solely on facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant;

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and then, two, determine, based on those facts, whether any person or persons were directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a federal offense."

That is the foundation for the analysis. It's not what could potentially be proven on a preponderance basis using civil discovery standards.

The ultimate harm, and the Fisher Court explained that the causal nexus must be not too attenuated, at 640 F.3d 648, note seven. To consider whether it was a direct causal connection, your Honor, the Fifth Circuit explained in Fisher that the direct and proximate harm language imposes dual requirements of fact -- of cause in fact and foreseeability.

A person is directly harmed by the commission of a federal offense where that offense is a but-for cause of the harm. And for proximate causation, your Honor, the Fifth Circuit explained that foreseeability is part of the analysis, but United States against Salinas, 918 F.3d at 466, set forth in the movants' brief for the proposition that there could be multiple but-for causes.

In that case, Salinas -- it was a sentencing enhancement, so it was only but-for causation -- there was no proximate causation. That was the alien-smuggling case where an individual who was being -- in the back of a truck had a heart attack when there was a high-speed chase.

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But the Court went on to say, a proximate cause inquiry would ask how directly each cause affected the final outcome. How directly. So based on Fisher and Salinas, we know that proximate cause incorporates both foreseeability and directness of the causal connection between the charged offense and the final outcome.

Further, as your Honor referenced in the BP

Products litigation, United States v. BP Products at 610 F.

Supp. 2d at 688, the Court said, "Proximate cause in a criminal case presents a higher threshold for proof than proximate cause in a civil tort case."

Your Honor, much was set forth in the discovery motion of the movants with respect to all of the different causal factors that they would bring to the table in terms of establishing direct and proximate causation.

But we don't think that you have to go there. In part because, by starting with the foundation of this criminal case, that foundation is more limited. It's more limited than was set forth in the letter from the amicus that was filed, and it's more limited than was set forth in the movants' filing.

Numerous factors would have to be considered in order to ultimately get to a direct and proximate causation finding here.

And ultimately, the idea that by creating or

providing information and then somebody else sort of

insinuating the Court, or even movants, into the decision as

to what crimes could be charged really runs afoul of the

provision in the CVRA that the discretion of the Attorney

General should not be undermined.

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And I'll speak a little bit about the In re Wild decision, the Eleventh Circuit's en banc decision in a moment in response to a question the Court had, but we disagree with the import of that case.

Our view is that In re: Wild called into question everything that Judge Marra did. Because In re Wild ultimately determined that the ancillary proceeding that was the vehicle leading to all of those rulings was ultimately not appropriate.

And so let me just speak a little bit about the causal factors, not because the United States is here to say these are all the causal factors and here's all the evidence.

Rather, there are issues that came up at the Forkner trial. There are issues that have been referenced in the government's filings with respect to the crash report from one of the crashes. The other crash report is an interim crash report. And also, expert filings that were made by Mr. Forkner in that criminal case.

But they relate to, ultimately, how remoteness

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would be established here because we know that the criminal conduct was focused on the FAA AEG, not all of the other disclosures that took place with respect to the expansion of MCAS. We know as well that the two conspirators here were not informed about the issues that led to those meetings with the FAA.

We also know that the lead person at the FAA AEG who was most responsible for making the training determination was invited to some of those meetings and that she, you know, for whatever reason, did not go. Those go to the scope of the conspiracy, your Honor.

With regard to -- but they also go to how much was known and foreseeable to the two individuals that form the basis of the conspiracy. Make no mistake, Boeing is vicariously liable for the conduct of the conspirators, but it has to be conspirators that act with criminal intent, not with respect to all other employees at Boeing that had nothing to do with the conspiracy.

Issues related to the conduct aimed at the training levels for U.S.-based airlines, as opposed to foreign airlines, communications with Boeing persons at foreign-based airlines and foreign regulators, issues with respect to the role of foreign regulators.

Issues related to the creation and design of the 737 MAX aircraft, to include product design of MCAS having

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only one AOA sensor operating at a time. Its susceptibility to failure.

The reliance on a single sensor to control and engage MCAS, and the manner in which MCAS engaged and reengaged. None of those issues, we submit, our evidence established the conspirators were aware of.

Issues related to the immediately preceding Lion Air flight prior to the crash flight, as referenced in the crash report cited by movants, where the AOA sensor improperly caused the MCAS system to engage and how that crew landed that plane without flight simulator training.

Issues related to what flight simulator training would actually have involved. Issues related to the service of the bad AOA sensor on the first crash by a third-party vendor. Issues related to the approval process. And so on, your Honor.

I point these out -- and there are others -- I point these out because the factual inquiry -- the factual inquiry about the relationship between the crime charged in this case and the ultimate outcome is substantial and it involves so many issues, ultimately, even the movants' construction took approximately 336 paragraphs to list out.

Now, we at the DOJ are not here to represent -the Department of Justice -- that all of these, these are
the facts that occurred. We do not accede to the accuracy

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of these crash reports. We do not necessarily embrace the underlying facts that support these causal factors.

What we have done during the course of our investigation is we have collected information, including the crash reports, that show so many different factors that create a separateness, that create a remoteness with respect to the crime charged and the crashes.

We don't think that you have to engage in what I think Judge Marra did, which is almost 10 years of litigation. We don't think you have to do that because you heard the evidence in the Forkner trial.

And the evidence in the Forkner trial dovetails almost precisely, if not precisely, with the statement of facts set forth in the DPA.

Now, I would like to address a couple issues with respect to the DPA. I think that your Honor asked a question or two about that.

Your Honor, the DPA does not work in the way that the movants in the amicus claim. There is no liability waiver for any individual. In fact, the DPA was filed in January of last year and Mr. Forkner was indicted almost 10 months later. There is no -- as set forth in paragraph 20(b) there is no liability waiver for any individual.

Further, the release from liability for Boeing is based on the conduct as set forth in the DPA, the statement

of facts, not for some broad array of potential federal crimes that movants suggest.

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It was more limited. However, the government did not come across evidence that it believed to be prosecutable during the course of its investigation to support those broad array of federal crimes.

The statements in the DPA concerning the lack of involvement in the criminal conspiracy by high-level corporate officials, that's specifically at paragraph 4(h). That goes to the facts and circumstances related to the guidelines calculation.

We set that out in our DPAs regularly: Here are considerations that we considered with respect to our determination as to whether or not the DPA is an appropriate outcome and the terms of the DPA. And moreover, they are accurate.

With respect to the crime charged, we did not find evidence of high-level involvement, of high-level corporate officials in the criminal conduct. Movants' assertions in this regard are incorrect.

Now, your Honor, I would like to address a couple of the issues with respect to the other motions, but if you have any questions on the CVRA motion itself, I want to obviously --

THE COURT: Go ahead and finish it out.

MR. DUFFY: I would like to go ahead and talk 1 2 about In re Dean. You asked questions about In re Dean. 3 In re Dean is different in this case in multiple ways. First, the government and the defendant in 4 In re Dean both agree that the victims in that case were, in 5 fact, crime victims of the crime charged. 6 That was acknowledged and that was assumed. The 7 government filed a motion to ask authority for delayed 8 9 notification. The court initially granted it. The Court of 10 Appeals ultimately determined that was improvident and 11 should not be granted. 12 The issue was not before the district court or the 13 Court of Appeals as to whether or not the crime victims --14 excuse me, the movants in that case were, in fact, crime 15 victims. 16 And with respect to the concept here that the 17 Court or the movants would second-quess the government in terms of its charging decision, we understand that there's 18 19 strong views. You know, we understand that too. 2.0 But the prosecutorial discretion in terms of 21 whether or not to bring a charge, that rests with the United 22 States. And the United States is charged to take care of 23 the laws that are faithfully executed. 2.4 I would like to address the ombudsman issue, your 25 Honor. First, the government apologizes to the movants and

other representatives of the crash victims that the 2 Department of Justice's ombudsman, in February 2020, 3 conveyed inaccurate information. That should have been 4 handled differently. 5 There was no deception. The construction of that communication is not accurate. Individuals at the victim 6 rights ombudsman's office at the Department of Justice 7 8 reached out to others in the department. 9 They were not provided with accurate information 10 in order to make an accurate response to the representatives 11 of the crash victims. That should have been handled differently. 12 13 should have been provided with accurate information. 14 the Department of Justice speaks about a matter, it should 15 speak accurately. 16 Often we don't comment on a nonpublic 17 investigations for various reasons. In this case, however, the crash victims were not crime victims under the CVRA. 18 19 But nonetheless, when a response was provided, they should 2.0 have been provided with an accurate response, and for that, 21 we apologize. There was no intention to mislead anybody. 22 Your Honor, with regard to the motion for 23 supervisory authority over the DPA, I think that was the one 2.4 that your Honor asked several questions about a few moments

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ago.

Let me start here by saying, in our view, the 1 2 crime victims do not have standing to do that, because 3 they -- excuse me, the movants do not have standing because 4 they are not crime victims under the CVRA. 5 But, moreover, we acknowledge that the Court could, in its discretion, choose not to accept the DPA. 6 Wе 7 acknowledge that. We don't think that that's warranted 8 under the facts of this case. 9 We recognize, as the Court just did, that on 10 January 24th, at docket entry 13, the Court made a finding that exclusion of time under the Speedy Trial Act would be 11 12 appropriate, but we also -- you know, but we also recognize 13 that, you know, a deferred prosecution agreement is 14 different than a filed charge. As the D.C. Circuit explained in Fokker -- and I 15 will talk about Fokker in a moment for a different 16 17 proposition -- but a deferred prosecution agreement is sort of -- it's a middle ground. 18 19 It's a middle ground between a filed charge with a 2.0 quilty plea, as happened in In re Dean, or the BP case with 21 the explosion there, or a nonprosecution agreement or a 22 declaration. 23 And there are reasons and justifications for 2.4 engaging in DPA. There's a long practice of doing that and 25 it allows -- you know, it allows sort of a middle ground.

Case 4:21-cr-00005-O Document 95 Filed 05/12/22 Page 73 of 189 PageID 1177 73 It allows the opportunity for a corporation or an individual 1 2 to show their good conduct. And ultimately, at the conclusion of the DPA, if its terms are successfully agreed 3 to, to successfully accomplish, I should say, for a 4 5 dismissal of the crime charged. That is what the United States intends to do here, 6 7 so long as Boeing continues to fulfill its obligations under the DPA. And thus far, Boeing has fulfilled its obligations 8 9 under the DPA. 10 Those obligations are substantial. The payments, your Honor -- your Honor asked a question about the 11 12 payments, and I do want to address that for a moment. 13 The MVRA, which is not specifically at issue here, 14 because there was not a filed charge and there was not a 15 conviction, the MVRA does authorize payments or restitution 16 payments to categories or persons or entities who are not 17 crime victims under the definition of the statute. If those payments are agreed to by the parties, the Court, the 18 19 statute says, shall order that they take place. 2.0 That was the provision that was modeled here in 21 terms of the DPA. It was not drawn out of whole cloth. 22

There was a precedent for doing that in the Takata airbag case, as was referenced in the government's filing.

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And the payments with respect to the movants and the crash victims, as well as with respect to the airline

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customers of Boeing, those are not payments that are made to crime victims under the CVRA. Those are payments that we agreed to contractually with respect to Boeing.

As we've said earlier, had we to do this over, we would have consulted with the crash victims at an earlier stage. But nonetheless, that consultation was not -- you know, was not required under the CVRA.

Your Honor, with respect to your supervisory authority over the DPA, we would ask you to look at Fokker and HSBC. We think the Second Circuit's decision in HSBC and the D.C. Circuit's decision in Fokker instructs that the Court certainly has authority, but it's in limited circumstances.

It's in circumstances where -- not necessarily where the Court is of the view that there has been -- you know, the terms are too lenient. Specifically, the issue in Fokker, or ultimately, that the Court may want to exercise additional supervision because it's concerned that in the future there might be some sort of misconduct or problem that might arise. And so that was the concern that underpinned the district court's decision in HSBC.

The Court in HSBC said the government -- the district court has no freestanding supervisory power to monitor the implementation of a DPA, but there might be, in certain circumstances, where that authority would be

appropriate.

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We would object -- if the Court were to exercise authority or ultimately determine that, for whatever reason, it was going to reject the DPA here, we would contend that the Court would not have authority to specify the terms of the DPA or any further agreement that might be reached by the parties.

This is not a plea agreement. So we think that that's different than a couple of cases that your Honor filed. Because a DPA, as I said a moment ago, is a middle ground. It's a contractual agreement that certainly is filed with the Court, but it's not the same as a Rule 11 inquiry. It's not the same types of inquiry that might take place with respect to a plea.

And ultimately, in Fokker Services, the Court said that a district court lacks authority to disapprove a DPA under the Speedy Trial Act on the grounds that the prosecution has been too lenient in its exercise of its charging discretion.

Here, we submit that we have not been too lenient.

I would ask the Court to come back for a moment to the evidence that it heard at the Forkner trial. I'm sure the Court has its view of that evidence. Certainly, the jury did.

Again, that was a different charge, with different

elements, a different offense. But nonetheless, the

evidence was very similar. We submit to you that it was a

much more narrow case that supported the charge in the

information here that has been submitted by either amicus or

the movants.

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Your Honor, with respect to the motion on arraignment -- for an arraignment or hearing conditions of release, we respectfully submit that the movants are misreading the rule.

We agree that if an arraignment occurs, then it must be in open court. But in many contexts an arraignment might not occur, such as here, where the government has an intention to move to dismiss the information, assuming certain conditions are met.

And that is, as we've said, both in our filings and today, that we do intend to do that. Again, assuming those conditions are met.

The contention that there have been some additional conditions of supervised release or some condition of supervised release, we submit, is, one, there isn't standing to make that argument at this point.

It doesn't mean that a member of the public -- the Court couldn't hear from a member of the public with respect to what conditions should be appropriate, but we submit that there are not additional conditions that are necessary.

That Boeing has, in a host of ways, met its obligations under the DPA.

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Those obligations are onerous. They include enhanced reporting requirements, the payments that we have suggested, and certain changes that are referenced in the DPA that the company has undertaken.

Not to mention the benefits, including, you know, with respect to the significant litigation that movants and other crash victims are engaged in, other third parties are engaged in with Boeing that relates to the crashes, and any concessions or factual assertions that were made in the DPA that Boeing is not allowed, under the terms of the DPA, to contradict.

In sum, in our view, there are instances, as

Boeing cited in its filing, and other instances where, in

the context of a DPA, a court does not hold an arraignment.

And in our view, it's unnecessary in this case. We

certainly understand the Court could disagree, but we just

don't see it as necessary.

It's not unlike -- well, there's other types of cases involving a cooperator or other things where certain types of hearings and proceedings might be delayed so the cooperator can undertake the cooperation before formal court proceedings begin.

We suggest the Court's order that I just

referenced makes that finding. You know, despite not having
the benefit of all the briefings that led to today's motion
hearing, the Court did make a finding that a delay of
approximately three and a half years, you know, would be
appropriate based on the submissions of the government and
Boeing.

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Your Honor, finally, I will turn to the discovery motion for a moment. We disagree with the movants' construction of the Doe cases in Judge Marra's opinion, Judge Marra's decision, with respect to the order of discovery. First of all, the CVRA does not provide for a discovery method or a discovery right.

The CVRA is very specific about various mechanisms. It has remedies. As the Court referenced, there's been two recent Supreme Court opinions where the Court has said district courts should be, you know, very careful about constructing remedies when a statute has otherwise, you know, set forth remedies.

The In re Wild decision talked about that at length with respect to the remedies that are set forth in the CVRA. But most importantly, your Honor, in that case, factually, the United States in that case agreed to provide discovery.

The United States, after initially objecting, ultimately agreed. And that issue was not fully litigated.

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And in our view, the order with respect to discovery in that case was essentially adopting an agreement or a concession that was ultimately made.

We don't think that there's precedent for the type of discovery -- precedent, in this circuit or otherwise, to order the type of discovery that's being requested here, or disclosure.

But I note that, I think it ultimately -- a number of the requests here really come down to some of the same issues that the Eleventh Circuit grappled with in In re Wild. And your Honor has said you read that case very carefully, so I'm not providing you with anything new.

But in response to counsel's arguments there, the Court said, look, the CVRA rights are, you know, subject to judicial enforcement.

But the problem is, is that if you try to go to what the government could have proved or what the government could have charged or what crimes the government might be able to charge, the problem there becomes, what is the limiting principle?

And ultimately, you're rubbing up against the government's prosecutorial discretion. And so I come back to In re Dean. I think In re Dean is obviously an important case for the Court's determination, but the difference between what's being attempted here, and what was sought in

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In re Dean, is not consultation or notice when the government, and ultimately the defendant, agreed that the movants or crime victims here, it's our concerted view that our criminal case, the case we were able to bring, we were able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, was limited. It was limited to the facts I've just referenced.

And to create a process where ultimately there's judicial enforcement and your Honor says, well, you know, you really need to consider additional charges here. That not only usurps, you know, the role of the district court, but of the prosecution in its determination as to what is an appropriate charge.

And the Court of Appeals in In re Wild said, that's actually not -- that's outside the ambit of the CVRA. That's not what the CVRA is designed to do. It's not designed to get the Court involved in a determination as to what crimes the government could bring or should bring.

And ultimately, we respectfully submit, that is what is being sought here. So for the reasons referenced in our brief, and that I've expanded on here, we respectfully request that the Court deny the four pending motions. I would be happy to address any questions.

THE COURT: Let me just ask you a few questions.

If I were to determine that they were crime victims under the statute, then the government would have violated at

least those provisions of the CVRA that require the sort of 1 2 consultation before the agreement is consummated; is that 3 true? 4 MR. DUFFY: Your Honor, I respectfully submit it would depend how you determined we violated them. If we go 5 into the In re Dean case, for example, and In re Dean, I 6 7 want to say, obviously, there is a chicken and egg, but in In re Dean, there's an understanding on the part of the 8 9 government, because it goes into court requests that there's 10 delayed notifications, there's understanding that the folks -- that they're crime victims, okay? 11 12 So the question I think you'd have to ask, if you 13 were going to go down that road is, at what point does -- at 14 what point do you determine that we determined that there were crime victims? 15 16 THE COURT: Right. 17 MR. DUFFY: That's the real problem. That's the issue, the discussion that the In re Wild judges had. 18 19 was quite a bit of back-and-forth on just that issue. 2.0 We respectfully submit that the Fifth Circuit 21 didn't reach that. They didn't consider that. I mean, it 22 took almost 100 pages of -- at least in my printout, it's 100 pages -- of opinions in the In re Wild decision just to 23 2.4 address that so that all of the judges could be heard. 25 I submit to you, Judge, that that would be

really -- that's incredibly difficult to do. That's why 1 2 courts haven't done it, because what that requires you to do 3 is say, at what point did you determine they were crime 4 victims? 5 Now, if we came forward and said, well, we determined they were crime victims at X period of time and 6 7 we want to ask the judge or we want to take some decision that is contrary to the CVRA, then we understand that. 8 9 That's basically what happened, for the most part, in 10 In re Dean. Here, you would have to -- I submit you'd have to 11 12 go to the issue of, okay, it's like, when did you know that? What did you know, and when did you know it? 13 14 So we obviously have the moment of filing. Of course, the Court could say, well, you know, at the moment 15 16 of filing --17 THE COURT: Well, let me just stop you there. So in your mind, though, it is not what I decide today. 18 19 your mind it is, you could have -- if I were to determine 2.0 they were crime victims, that would not answer the question 21 in your mind. 22 The real question is, did you, in advance, make a good-faith, honest mistake, in my view? If I were to go 23 2.4 this way, that's what I would be saying about whether or not 25 they were crime victims.

And therefore, if you made a good-faith, honest 2 but, in my view, erroneous mistake, if I were to go that 3 way, you would not have violated the CVRA, those provisions 4 that are required in advance? 5 MR. DUFFY: Well, I'm not -- I'm not saying that precisely. I think that sort of goes to prospective and 6 7 sort of looking back, I think that's how counsel sort of constructed it a moment ago. 8 9 What I am saying is we would, you know -- the problem with coming to that observation, your Honor, is sort 10 11 of -- is saying, okay, so at what point was that? 12 Because if you're talking about a violation of 13 CVRA, what does that basically mean? 14 Does it mean when we filed the information on 15 January 7th of last year, or was it at some prior time, when 16 we were, you know, doing negotiations, so on and so forth? 17 But the issue, I think, then requires, what about our evidence? What did our evidence show? You know, what 18 19 was the evidence when we collected it? 2.0 I think that's really what movants are getting at. I think that's what they want to get at. They want to know 21 22 what our evidence was so they can make exactly that claim. I don't know if the request by movants have 23 2.4 anything to do with civil litigation, but what it does seem 25 is that it's to expand the concepts of when or the time

period of that violation. 1 2 So I think that it's not -- it's a very 3 complicated question because, as we've said, as the Court 4 has seen, you've seen our evidence, most of it, and you've 5 seen what we stipulated to in the DPA. And so I think we'd have to -- you know, we have 6 7 to hear from you what your view was of that, and then we would have to respond. We can do so in good faith, but we 8 9 try to, you know, figure out our best way forward. 10 THE COURT: Let me just ask you this, try to put 11 it this way, then. Were you required at some point, when 12 you were zeroing in on what you were going to do in this 13 case, before you had consummated, obviously, but you were 14 zeroing in, were you required to consider what Judge 15 Higginbotham wrote in In re Fisher, to imagine the world in 16 which Boeing and Forkner and his colleague did not act in 17 the way they did. And then determine whether, had they not done 18 19 that, these individuals would have lost their lives? 2.0 At some point, but before you initiated this 21 proceeding, were you required to do that? 22 MR. DUFFY: I believe -- I believe that we were. 23 I think that, you know, we are in the Fifth Circuit, and we 2.4 adhere to the Court's ruling in Fisher.

The reason, though, that I went through, not all

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MR. DUFFY: -- the fact that this particular 1 2 sensor was broken. But also, and I think most importantly 3 for your Honor's consideration for but-for and proximate causation, for both, the facts, as referenced in the crash 4 5 reports -- which again, we're not sponsoring those facts -but the fact the issues that the immediately preceding 6 7 flight, the immediately preceding flight had more or less the same thing happen. 8 9 And that immediately preceding flight with the 10 faulty AOA sensor, those pilots were able to land that 11 plane. And then it wasn't reported, that problem, 12 adequately. It wasn't serviced adequately. And those --13 and those, apparently, again -- all apparently, because, you 14 know, we, the government, are not trying to sponsor or 15 represent those facts, but those kinds of things are breaks 16 in the causal chain. They just, they have to. 17 I want to come back just for a moment, if I may, just to your question, your Honor, In re McNulty, which 18 19 again, was one of the 2010-era cases that Judge 2.0 Higginbotham, and the Fifth Circuit looked to in the Fisher 21 decision. And again, that's at 597 F.3d 344, but 22 specifically at page 351. 23 They give a few examples of when an individual 24 might have been harmed, directly and proximately harmed in 25 commission of an offense that are close temporally or

1 proximately to the crime charged.

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One example that's provided on that page was a bank robbery, where an individual was inside the bank -- or attempted bank robbery, and a shotgun was pointed in the individual's face, approximately six feet away. And the individual claimed, you know, restitution under that. And the Court in that case, you know, approved that.

Another example was another bank robbery where, in the course of the bank robbery, in the getaway car, the individual crashed into a police vehicle and damaged a third party's property in the course of the commission of the offense.

And the court in that case indicated that, no, those are crime victims as well, because it was close -- it was close -- it was during the commission of the offense, so it was close in time.

And I think, you know, to come back to your point, in Fisher, you know, there was, you know, a competitor contractor -- it was Mr. Meacham's case -- competitive contractor.

You know, significant sums had been provided by the competitor, Mr. Fisher. He ultimately did not -- was not awarded the contract.

It's fairly clear that there was a corrupt process involved in the contract by the defendant, and that there

1 was a causal relationship, some causal relationship between the corrupt process and the fact that the individual, 2 3 Mr. Fisher, had not been awarded the contract. 4 But nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit said, no, that's not enough. That's too remote. Too remote because 5 it's not -- it does not go to the facts, you know, reflected 6 7 in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant, and it's not a direct and proximate harm. 8 THE COURT: Well, Fisher didn't prove his status I 9 10 quess is a way to say it, because his complaint was that the 11 conspiracy was concealed. It wasn't the conspiracy, but that it was concealed, but that wasn't the charged crime. 12 13 The charged crime was conspiracy. 14 MR. DUFFY: Right. 15 THE COURT: Not concealing conspiracy. And so, 16 the Circuit said that he did not -- I assume Judge Lynn --17 said he did not reach this status because, had it been known, he wouldn't have bid at all, because he wouldn't bid 18 19 in a process that is rigged by way of an illegal conspiracy 2.0 against him. 21 MR. DUFFY: Right. 22 THE COURT: And so what I'm wondering here is, 23 though, as it relates to the stipulated facts in paragraphs 2.4 49 and 53, that it appears to be the case that, in these two 25 airline crashes, MCAS activated.

And MCAS, I'm sorry I don't know the technical 1 2 term, but the nose of the plane was pushed down so that it 3 plummets. And so why isn't that alone enough to conclude that they would be crime victims based upon the stipulated 4 5 facts here, even if another pilot might have been, you know, a Top Gun graduate and can maneuver out of something like 6 7 that? MR. DUFFY: That doesn't get -- that doesn't get 8 to direct or proximate cause. Specifically, those focus on 9 10 proximate cause. Because we know that proximate cause is not just foreseeability, it is, as the Fifth Circuit said in 11 12 Salinas, it's proximate cause incurred. That's how directly each cause affected the final outcome. 13 14 And the crash reports, for example, alone have 15 hundreds of pages of causes. They do. And what we know 16 from our -- from the criminal case here and, again, you have 17 to look at, again, the stipulated facts -- but the aspects -- the problematic aspects of MCAS that later became 18 19 known were not known to Mr. Forkner. They were not known to 20 Boeing Individual Employee Number Two. 21 In fact, the key chat, the text message chat, 22 which I'm sure the Court remembers it, "I lied to regulators 23 unknowingly." And the next line, or line -- two lines later 2.4 is, "Why are we just learning about this now?" 25 And we know that there were disclosures to the FAA

by Boeing employees about the technical aspects of 2 substantial disclosures on multiple occasions. We know that 3 those disclosures took place. We know --4 And so, unlike the claims of some, you know, it was not a necessary part of the conspiracy that everybody at 5 Boeing say nothing about MCAS, you know, to the FAA. 6 7 We also, with respect to the remoteness, we also -- so there's a foreseeability issue there with respect 8 9 to the conspirators. I don't think -- one of the key things 10 here is to not conflate what everybody at Boeing knew with 11 what the conspirators knew. 12 That's a key part of this Court's analysis. Court's heard the evidence, saw the evidence of that. It's 13 14 relatively limited. That's a key underpin here, I think, to vour decision. 15 Another component is that there were -- the 16 conduct -- the focus of the conduct here was to the FAA AEG. 17 The congressional report, cited again in the Forkner case, 18 19 the congressional report indicates that, you know, contrary 2.0 to the movants' claims, that the FAA AEG did not have 21 control over what foreign regulators or foreign airlines did 22 with respect to training. The conduct, again --23 As you go through the causal factors, and the MCAS 2.4 itself had product design issues. I don't know if I want to

go so far as to say product design flaws -- others might say

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that -- but there are significant product design issues that 1 2 are raised here, not known to the conspirators. Not known. 3 So when you combine those with the fact that, in the immediately preceding flight, when it did improperly 4 5 engage, that crew was apparently able to land the plane, it does go to but-for causation, as well as proximate 6 7 causation. THE COURT: Let me ask you this. In terms of 8 making this decision, is it proper that I would consider the 9 statement of facts? 10 In other words, I'm not limited to simply the 11 12 information that you have filed. Would it be proper for me 13 to consider that, as well as consider the statement of facts 14 that you all have filed? 15 MR. DUFFY: Yes, your Honor. And we think that's

exactly what the In re McNulty case said as cited by -- I'm sorry.

THE COURT: No. No. And just if I may follow up on that, did you have an opportunity to read your colleague's citation to the D.C. Circuit opinion In re de Henriquez?

MR. DUFFY: Yes.

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THE COURT: And so as it relates to that, then, do you feel like, at least in the D.C. Circuit, that they are permitting the district judge to consider evidence outside

Case <u>4:21-cr-00005-O Document</u> 95 Filed 05/12/22 Page 92 of 189 PageID 1196 ⁹² those kinds of documents? 1 2 MR. DUFFY: A couple things about that case. 3 first, we think that case was incorrectly decided. 4 THE COURT: By the D.C. Circuit? MR. DUFFY: By the D.C. Circuit. We do. 5 We also think that was a different type of case. 6 7 It was a drug conspiracy where there was an alleged murder. THE COURT: Right. 8 9 MR. DUFFY: And then, you know, there was a 10 different concept of foreseeability in that context. 11 a paramilitary organization in Colombia. And, you know, the 12 sort of the head, I don't want to call it anti-paramilitary 13 organization, but somebody who's ultimately -- you know, who 14 was murdered. 15 In that case, the Court of Appeals did not say 16 that the claimed conduct was, in fact, a crime victim. They 17 said that the district court should essentially consider the statement to be provided. And then consider that in the 18 19 context of the crime charged and the factual basis that's 2.0 set forth. 21 THE COURT: And I guess my question to you -- I 22 only read the opinion. So I didn't look at any of the 23 briefs or --2.4 MR. DUFFY: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- or any of the evidence submitted

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with the briefs -- but the D.C. Circuit reversed, directed the district court to consider, as you say, whether they were crime victims.

And the D.C. Circuit said the question is whether the murder bears the requisite connection to the overall conspiracy.

So my question to you is, why did they have to do that if, in the D.C. Circuit, they would be limited to the indictment and the factual resume, because the D.C. Circuit undoubtedly would have had both of those on appeal?

MR. DUFFY: Sure. And also to your point, Judge, you know, in Fisher there was a victim impact statement by Mr. Fisher in a related case.

And so they considered the victim impact statement that had been made by Mr. Fisher in ultimately their determination. We would concede that direct and proximate causation is not solely defined by the statement of facts.

But what we would say, your Honor, is that the statement of facts are what the government can prove beyond a reasonable doubt, or said they can, and that's what the defendant has agreed. And so that statement of facts forms the basis.

And it's not just -- and I would say this, your

Honor, de Henriquez does not talk about proximate causation

necessarily. It talks about the but-for causation. It

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doesn't go into the analysis. That's one of the reasons why we think it doesn't solely answer the question here.

If you come back to the concept of proximate causation, you have to ask about remoteness and all the other causal factors. This is not a scenario, your Honor, where there is a violent drug organization in Colombia that's distributing large quantities of cocaine and willing to murder people that are in its way.

This is a fact pattern that the Court heard during the Forkner trial, cabined and limited in the ways that we've discussed today, but that the Court saw during the evidence.

And then there are all of these different causal factors. So many. Quite a few. I could go through a few more that we believe the Court would ultimately have to get to.

And the reason we don't think the Court has to do that is because there are so many. It's not as simple as saying, well, MCAS may have played a role, and then the crashes happened. It's, okay, but there are -- that's not what the crime charged was.

Let's start with that. The crime charged was about what Mr. Forkner and Mr. Gustavsson knew -- excuse me, Employee Individual Number Two knew with respect to the time period of the conspiracy. And they did not know all the

issues about MCAS. They didn't know its faults.

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They didn't know what had been disclosed to the FAA. What they did know, we submit, is that it had fired in a simulator in a way that was at low speed.

And so it was outside the parameters that had previously been disclosed. The only other evidence as set forth in the statement of facts, the only other evidence about confirming that was Mr. Loffing, who's referenced by nomenclature, but the Court heard his testimony in trial that, I had a conversation confirming the expansion but not the details. I referred Mr. Forkner to other engineers at Boeing.

I'm summarizing, but that's, I think -- I'm sure
the Court will remember that testimony.

And if we come back from that, I want to reiterate, we did not find, and the statement of facts does not include that there were other — other occasions where that evidence or that information was provided to Mr. Forkner. Here are the problems. Here are the issues. So we have to come back to, I think, foreseeability and remoteness.

And that's the reason, when you talk about all of these different causal factors, that's the reason that we believe, certainly under Fisher and under the construction of McNulty, that there is no proximate cause, let alone a

Case <u>4:21-cr-00005-O Document</u> 95 Filed 05/12/22 Page 96 of 189 PageID 1200 ⁹⁶ but-for causation. 1 2 THE COURT: Let me ask you to address this 3 question. Would the Department of Justice be prohibited 4 under this agreement from bringing a manslaughter or a 5 negligent homicide or some other case against Boeing related 6 to the injury, the deaths of these individuals, if you 7 believed you have evidence that could establish that? MR. DUFFY: Your Honor, first, I have to say we 8 9 did not find evidence that would establish that, first. 10 THE COURT: Right. Well, let's just take the 11 hypothetical. Let's assume that you uncover some evidence 12 that would allow you to make that case, and they didn't hide 13 it. You uncover it, they didn't hide it. Just 14 hypothetically. Just humor me. 15 MR. DUFFY: That's extremely difficult, your 16 Honor. 17 THE COURT: Yeah. 18 MR. DUFFY: Because --19 THE COURT: And that's what hypotheticals do. 2.0 MR. DUFFY: Yes, sir. 21 THE COURT: So just so I can understand the DPA --22 MR. DUFFY: Right. 23 THE COURT: -- because I have a follow-up question about that as it relates to these individuals. 2.4 25 MR. DUFFY: Right.

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THE COURT: And so --1 2 MR. DUFFY: It would entirely depend. The 3 hypothetical would entirely depend on what the facts were that led to that conclusion. You asked, could we bring that 4 5 case? THE COURT: Yeah. 6 7 MR. DUFFY: We could not bring that case based on the facts set forth in the DPA, because there is a 8 9 limitation of liability with respect to the facts set forth 10 in the DPA. But specifically, the conduct related to those facts. So it's the conduct for which there's a limitation 11 12 on liability. All right? And so we did not find evidence that these other 13 14 charges could be brought. And, in fact, I have to come back 15 to the evidence that we did find of criminal conduct. 16 was extremely limited. 17 You can't import what the 300-something paragraphs that have been put forth in the movants' filing or what 18 19 might be in a Netflix documentary or articles about this 2.0 scenario, you can't import that into a criminal case. 21 did not find evidence of criminal intent -- criminal 22 intent -- by actors beyond Mr. Forkner and Boeing Employee 23 Number Two. That is the footprint here. 2.4 So if we're talking about -- if we're talking 25 about a manslaughter with respect to Mr. Forkner and

Individual Number Two, you know, and then holding Boeing 1 2 accountable criminally for that? That case, we didn't find 3 that. We didn't find anything close. 4 THE COURT: Right. And so my question to you, though, is just assume for a moment that someone at DOJ 5 6 didn't read all the documents carefully. 7 And now because Judge Cassell has raised this issue, you've gone back and reviewed them, or your successor 8 9 comes to the view that you were wrong and we certainly ought 10 to prosecute Boeing for this. We certainly could prosecute Boeing for this on the facts. 11 12 Would this DPA agreement bind your successor to 13 not bringing that manslaughter case? 14 MR. DUFFY: It would depend on the following: 15 would depend if the evidence that you're saying came to light, if it was new evidence that was outside the conduct 16 17 set forth in the DPA. THE COURT: And if it was not new evidence -- in 18 19 other words, it existed at the time. Someone just didn't 2.0 realize it, didn't discover it, didn't appreciate the 21 significance of it. A new set of eyes comes in and looks at 22 it, your successor, and they come to the conclusion, boy, 23 Boeing is liable here. We could convict Boeing on this.

limitation on liability has several exclusions, which I'm

MR. DUFFY: Well, let me say a couple things. The

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sure the Court has seen in plea agreements, such as a crime 1 2 of violence, a tax offense, and so forth. So there would be 3 an issue as to whether or not that's a crime of violence, 4 candidly. And so that's a more subtle question that maybe 5 you're going to ask that too, which I would be happy to try 6 7 to respond, but I can't respond to that off the top of my 8 head. 9 THE COURT: Okav. 10 MR. DUFFY: What I can say, though, is that the facts set forth in the DPA are much more limited than 11 12 everything, you know, that happened with respect to the 13 design flaws, not there. 14 With respect to what did and did not get disclosed on the engineering side, not there. The contents at least. 15 There is reference that there were other disclosures. 16 17 With respect to, you know, the incentives that may have existed within the company generally to try to get the 18 19 MAX approved within a certain period of time, not there. 2.0 Because that's not criminal conduct from our 21 perspective. We didn't find evidence that persons acted 22 with criminal intent in that regard. 23 THE COURT: Let me try this. If the DPA would 2.4 prevent the Department of Justice from indicting Boeing for 25 a manslaughter-type charge or for a charge related to Lion

Case 4:21-cr-00005-O Document 95 Filed 05/12/22 Page 100 of 189 PageID 1204¹⁰⁰ Air and Egyptian Air, whatever the charge is, okay, if the 1 2 DPA would prevent that -- you got to assume with me, okay? 3 MR. DUFFY: Yes, sir. THE COURT: I'm not asking you to concede that. 4 Just assume with me it is. 5 MR. DUFFY: Yes. 6 7 THE COURT: Would that then make these people crime victims? 8 9 MR. DUFFY: If we specifically agreed to waive 10 liability on a crime for which they were harmed, would they 11 be crime victims? 12 Your Honor, I don't believe that there's specific 13 case law on that, so that would be new. I am not aware of a 14 case that says that. So I don't -- I'm not aware of that. 15 You've asked me -- I am not aware of that. 16 You've asked me sort of on a very large 17 hypothetical that I think is relatively, with respect, far afield from the facts in this case. 18 19 THE COURT: And I'm sorry we're running long here. 2.0

THE COURT: And I'm sorry we're running long here.

I was hoping to get you all out of here by lunchtime. So just let me make sure that I've asked you what I need to ask.

The Court in In re Dean says that the district courts, so it says that I am "bound to enforce" the CVRA's

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requirement that the prosecutors confer with the victims.

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If I were to conclude that they were victims, how
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      would I enforce that in this case today?
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                MR. DUFFY: Your Honor, if you concluded that they
      were victims, and we respectfully request that you do not
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      for the reasons submitted, you know, I would note that the
      Attorney General himself has already met with the victims in
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      this case.
                THE COURT: And that is very commendable to Judge
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      Garland. I'm not surprised that he has done that. So I
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      should have made note of that when I started.
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                But, yes. Go ahead.
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                MR. DUFFY: And that was the third of three
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      meetings that took place. The United States has stated in
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      its brief that it stands by the decision that was made.
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      That decision is based on the facts as we've gathered them
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      after our investigation.
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                But if you were, you know, to order us to, you
      know, to meet with the crime victims, we would accede to the
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      Court's order, of course. I mean, I don't know --
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                THE COURT: That's how I would enforce it.
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                MR. DUFFY: I don't know what the contours of the
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      Court's order would be.
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                THE COURT: Yeah.
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                MR. DUFFY: Because obviously, we would have to
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      consider, you know, the implications in this and other
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Case 4:21-cr-00005-O Document 95 Filed 05/12/22 Page 102 of 189 PageID 1206¹⁰² cases. 1 2 THE COURT: Yes. Yes. MR. DUFFY: Candidly, but I do -- we certainly --3 THE COURT: But to some degree --4 5 MR. DUFFY: -- on a prospective basis, if the Court were to focus on -- if I may? If your question is on 6 7 a prospective basis, what would we do? THE COURT: In this case, not with other cases. 8 9 MR. DUFFY: In this case. Understood. 10 THE COURT: I realize your briefing said you were 11 making policy changes, but as it relates to this case. As 12 it relates to this case. 13 MR. DUFFY: First, we would follow the letter of 14 your order. You know, you could, of course, order us to 15 meet with the victim -- the movants. You know, whether or 16 not you determine that they're crime victims under CVRA is, 17 you know, a different issue, but we -- you could order us to 18 further meet with the movants to provide them notice and so 19 forth. 2.0 We actually have been providing notice of the 21

We actually have been providing notice of the hearings and of the Forkner hearings, so on and so forth, on a voluntary basis through our website. Through a website notification process and so forth. And so that you certainly could do.

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THE COURT: Just one more question. Is it the

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Department's view that, when there is a violation of the
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      CVRA, that these remedies are appropriate, or as a
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      prudential matter, or are you of the view that the law, the
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      CVRA itself, and the opinions interpreting that provide for
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      these remedies?
                MR. DUFFY: Excuse me, your Honor, "these
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      remedies, " meaning what's set forth in the CVRA?
                THE COURT: Of course, setting the agreement
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      aside --
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                MR. DUFFY: Oh, okav.
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                THE COURT: -- restoring the case to the status
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      quo ante, before all of this occurred.
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                I guess what I'm asking you is, is it your view
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      that, if there are CVRA violations, that there is no remedy
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      for these people?
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                The Eleventh Circuit is back and forth, for
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      instance, in that anything that occurs that I might do or
      that Judge Rosenthal did, that we're just doing that as a
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      prudential matter and you're not objecting to it?
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                MR. DUFFY: Right. The CVRA, first of all, with
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      respect to some of the remedies, I'll understand that
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      question to mean, for example, a set-aside of the DPA.
      Well, excising provisions of the DPA or some of the other
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      things you just referenced.
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                It is our view that those are outside the CVRA.
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That those are not specifically provided in the CVRA. 1 2 However, the CVRA does specify remedies, including an 3 administrative remedy to have any complaints, with respect to the CVRA or any violations, be heard internally. There's 4 5 a specific provision about that, your Honor. I think you should consider that seriously, 6 7 because that's what Congress put there. And Congress said, we are designating the attorney general to be the final 8 9 arbiter of this, but we're designating the attorney general 10 to promulgate rules and to, you know, see that personnel from the Department of Justice follow the provisions of the 11 12 CVRA. 13 So it's our view that there is a remedy provision, 14 and that that is the remedy provision that should exist. But nonetheless, we're also committed to doing -- going 15 16 beyond that. 17 So we're committed, for example, as we have here, to reaching out to folks who might not be CVRA crime victims 18 19 by definition, but as we've referenced here, as with the 2.0 analogy of 3663(a)(3) this sort of -- you know, in the 21 Takata case, I don't think it called it additional persons, 22 but additional persons who may have been impacted in some 23 way. 2.4 And so, for example, the \$500,000,000 payment here

or the payments to the airlines. So having communications

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with them to making them informed and part of the process,
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      that is what we referenced obliquely to a degree in our
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      filings is right now under consideration by the Department
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      as to how to do a better job with that.
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                THE COURT: Okay. Well, one more guestion. You
      said I would have had the power originally to reject the
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 7
      DPA. Is that authority in the Speedy Trial Act?
                Do you agree that the interpretation of (h)(2)
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      that Mr. Cassell provides is the authority to do that?
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                MR. DUFFY: We don't agree with that construction
      of it.
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                THE COURT: Okay.
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                MR. DUFFY: Because both HSBC and Fokker say such
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      a determination would have to be based on something
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      substantial. And there has not been a court that has held
      that a DPA could be set aside based on a violation of the
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17
      CVRA.
                THE COURT: No. No. I'm sorry. I wasn't
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      clear. I moved over to the Speedy Trial Act, 3161.
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                MR. DUFFY: Yes.
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                THE COURT: And so my authority to, for whatever
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      reason, I set aside, if I were to reject the DPA. Where is
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      the authority, even if it meets the high burden that you
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      would agree would allow me to do that, where does that
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      authority come from?
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Is it this speedy trial provision that has "with 1 2 the approval of the Court" or is it something else? 3 MR. DUFFY: Ultimately, your Honor, it would be in connection with the Speedy Trial Act. Although Fokker says 4 5 specifically the limitations on that. So we don't think that that authority would be, well, I'm going to set it 6 7 aside. It would have to be based on some very -- you know, a basis that was far outside that in Fokker or in HSBC. 8 9 THE COURT: And what would be an example that 10 would permit that? I promise that's my last question. MR. DUFFY: Well, HSBC talked about a couple of 11 12 examples. HSBC talked about if there was some sort of 13 substantial government misconduct, for example. 14 But not -- you know, but in relation to the 15 mechanism or the means by which the DPA was arrived at or something along those lines, we respectfully submit that 16 17 that's not here. Even if, your Honor, even if you were to find that 18 there was a violation of CVRA, I respectfully submit that 19 20 the causal factors here are substantial. 21 The causal factors between the crashes and the 22 conduct charged in the information, first, are remote, and have a degree of remoteness that there isn't precedent on 23 2.4 point that would show that, oh, in this fact pattern, folks 25 such as this would be considered to be crime victims under

Case 4:21-cr-00005-O Document 95 Filed 05/12/22 Page 107 of 189 PageID 1211¹⁰⁷

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the CVRA, given the limited conduct that really is -- forms
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      the basis of a criminal charge here.
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                And that -- so we come back to the issue of,
      okay, if there's an incredibly close question, is that
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      substantial misconduct? And we would say, respectfully,
      that that is not.
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                THE COURT: Very good. Thank you.
                MR. HATCH: Good morning, your Honor. Ben Hatch
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      on behalf of The Boeing Company.
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                Thank you, your Honor. The Court clearly has the
      benefit of the briefing and has reviewed the briefing, has
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      reviewed the cases.
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                And with the Court's indulgence, what I plan to do
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      is really focus on what I see as the core issues of the
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      case, which I think actually dovetails well with the
      questions the Court has asked to the other counsel.
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                So with the Court's indulgence, I will try to do
      that, and be direct. I welcome any questions the Court has
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      as I proceed at any point.
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                THE COURT: Yes.
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                MR. HATCH: And then address a couple comments I
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      think Mr. Cassell made separately.
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                I do want to begin and, your Honor, this is in our
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      brief, and I would not generally repeat our briefs at all,
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      but I did want to begin by saying to the Court, and in light
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Case 4:21-cr-00005-O Document 95 Filed 05/12/22 Page 108 of 189 PageID 1212¹⁰⁸

of the representatives of the crash victims that are here 1 2 today, something that Boeing did say in its brief, which is 3 that Boeing acknowledges and profoundly regrets the inestimable impacts of these tragic accidents. 4 5 And it extends its deepest condolences to all the families and loved ones of those lost on the Lion Air 610 6 7 and Ethiopian 302 flights. Thank you, your Honor. Turning to the legal issues that are before the 8 Court. I think the Court looks first to the text of the 9 10 statute. Here, the text of the statute is the CVRA. 11 There's four things in the CVRA that I think are 12 dispositive textually over this whole case. First, there is 13 no right to dictate the terms of a DPA that is granted to 14 CVRA victims. In fact, the CVRA expressly in 3771(d)(6) 15 reserves to the attorney general and his designees prosecutor discretion. And that's what's reflected in the 16 17 DPA. There's no right to discovery and there is no 18 19 right to reopen a DPA. I think that's indisputable in the 20 text of the statute. 21 The fourth point is that the definition of a CVRA 22 victim turns on a federal offense. And this Court asks 23 questions about -- I think to Mr. Duffy -- about could there be victims of an uncharged offense? 2.4 25 And the answer, in my interpretation of the CVRA,

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is no. There has to be a federal offense. I think the case law supports that. Here, the federal offense is the offense reflected in Count I of the criminal information before the Court.

And so that would be the federal offense to which the Court would look in assessing whether these movants are direct and proximate victims of that federal offense, not some uncharged hypothetical, you know, perhaps investigated, perhaps not, crime.

The case law, and that segues into the case law, does not support that. Really, there's five cases that I wanted to touch on quickly that your Honor has asked questions on pretty much every one of these.

But they're In re Dean, I assume the Court looks first at Fifth Circuit authority. So In re Dean. There's the Fisher case. There is HSBC, and Fokker, and then In re Wild, not necessarily in that order.

In re Dean, your Honor, I submit actually supports denying the requested relief here. In In re Dean, and I know Mr. Cassell walked over that history, although I did want to fill in the last chapter, as the Court said, you had not read the remand decision by Judge Rosenthal.

In re Dean, the Fifth Circuit said on mandamus that there had been not been -- or there should have been consultation prior to entering into the plea agreement that

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was entered into with BP in that case, but it did not order 1 that that consultation occur as a remedy. 2 3 I think there's a good argument, your Honor, that that's dicta in the decision, but I don't know that the 4 5 Court really needs to go there. It did say there should have been consultation. 6 7 But ultimately, at the end of the day, it did not order on remand that there be consultation preplea. 8 9 plea had already been entered and proposed, right? 10 And it's parallel in that respect to this case, 11 where there's an agreement that's already been entered on 12 the Court's docket. 13 What the Fifth Circuit said, in denying mandamus, 14 was I'm going to send it back to Judge Rosenthal who has 15 allowed these victims to be heard at the plea hearing. 16 Similarly, this Court has allowed these movants to be heard 17 at length today on their arguments. We're going to trust Judge Rosenthal to evaluate 18 19 their input in deciding on whether to accept the plea 2.0 agreement which the Fifth Circuit had put on hold while that 21 mandamus ran its course. 22 On remand, it went back down to Judge Rosenthal in a very lengthy and thorough opinion. Judge Rosenthal 23 2.4 addressed all the movants or victims in that case --25 Mr. Duffy said he agreed they were CVRA victims -- addressed Case 4:21-cr-00005-O Document 95 Filed 05/12/22 Page 111 of 189 PageID 1215¹¹¹

1 all of their arguments and determined ultimately to accept 2 the plea that was entered. And so that's important because, even though the 3 4 Fifth Circuit said there should have been, again, 5 potentially in dicta, but there should have been preplea consultation. That was not the remedy that was ordered. 6 7 That was denied. It went back down and the judge considered their 8 views and ultimately accepted the plea that had been entered 9 10 without the benefit specifically of any preplea 11 consultation. 12 So I think the Court can take from In re Dean that 13 it was not a remedy in that case to undo the plea agreement. 14 And the other point is, of course, the Court has a different 15 role with respect to plea agreements than a court does with 16 respect to DPAs. 17 The plea agreement in the In re Dean case had to have a hearing in front of the court. Ultimately, the Court 18 19 had to decide whether to accept it. And then pleas, of 20 course, precede sentencing in federal criminal law. 21 And CVRA victims would have rights to be heard at 22 those stages of the case, right? The plea hearing and at 23 sentencing. 2.4 A DPA, by contrast, is an agreement to defer 25 prosecution on a charge -- one or more charges. Here, one

charge. And all that's been entered is that agreement on 1 2 this Court's docket that has deferred prosecution, and the 3 Speedy Trial Act has been extended under the court's order. 4 And so there are not those similar proceedings to be had as 5 happened in In re Dean. But I think the key point is In re Dean actually 6 7 supports not granting the relief that's requested here because the Fifth Circuit did not send it back for preplea 8 consultation in that case. So that was the last stage of 9 10 that case. With respect to one common thread, your Honor, and 11 12 I very much respect Mr. Cassell's arguments in reading the 13 cases. He's in almost every one I read. I did not have the 14 background of this body of law that he obviously has, having 15 litigated it for so long. But his cases are often district court cases that 16 17 then did not get affirmed or supported on appeal. In re Wild is the second case I would come to. I know the 18 19 Court's already asked about it and heard argument on it. 2.0 In re Wild is the only case that I could find, and 21 Mr. Cassell cited it, where a court contemplated undoing, in 22 that case, a nonprosecution agreement. I say contemplated 23 because the court in the district court proceedings never 2.4 actually ordered that as relief.

The opinion that talked about undoing an NPA was

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an opinion about whether there was standing to even engage in those proceedings. The court said the government's argument was there is no redressability as required under Article III because you can't put aside an NPA. The court said, no, I think I could put one aside, but that was just a 6 standing decision.

Ultimately, the district court never ordered invalidating that NPA because ultimately Mr. Epstein passed away, and so relief was denied.

And then, when they go up to the Eleventh Circuit en banc, what did we learn? Which is that that 10 years of litigation should have never happened.

The specific holding of the en banc court is that there's no private right of action created by the CVRA, as was utilized in the district court in that case, but the Court has read it.

The reasoning of In re Wild I think is broadly important to the issues in this case. It talks about the impingement on prosecutorial discretion that would occur if you try to assess who are CVRA victims, which you need to know what's the federal offense if you try to do that for a crime the government has not brought. Okay?

And so that's why I think here the Court has to look under the CVRA to the Count I criminal information for all the reasons that In re Wild said there's no basis to go

Case 4:21-cr-00005-O Document 95 Filed 05/12/22 Page 114 of 189 PageID 1218¹¹⁴ 1 beyond that. 2 Only the prosecutor can determine what federal 3 offenses are supported beyond a reasonable doubt from his or 4 her investigation and bring those charges. And In re Wild, 5 I think, has very persuasive reasoning on that that really undercuts, even though it's specifically just talking about 6 7 the private right of action, it really undercuts the 8 reasoning of several of the subsequent district court 9 decisions in that series of litigation. 10 With respect to Fokker and HSBC, I will take those These are other ones where Mr. Cassell relied on 11 12 the district court decisions, but then they were 13 subsequently overturned on appeal. 14 The Court has asked about, can the Court overturn 15 Reopen the DPA? You know, does the Court need to the DPA? 16 approve the DPA? 17 I think those appellate decisions line up to say, no, there's not. Unlike a plea agreement, unlike certain 18 19 other stages, a court does not approve a DPA. It's filed on 2.0 the court's docket. The court decides whether to exclude 21 time under the Speedy Trial Act, which your Honor has 22 already ruled on.

There's no later approval by the court, that -- as Mr. Duffy was saying, a DPA is not a plea. It's a lesser form of resolution. So there's no approval by the court of

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a DPA.

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And what those cases -- looking to your Honor's questions about the Speedy Trial Act, what they say. In neither case did they undo the DPA. So both of them were just discussing possible outcomes, right, because they both denied or overturned the district court in those cases.

What they say about the Speedy Trial Act is a court -- the language about approval of the court -- a court would potentially look at a DPA that's filed under a Speedy Trial Act.

And if the court felt it was a sham, it was just presented to exclude time without a real intent to defer and engage in that agreement, that would be the kind of lens the court would take under the Speedy Trial Act. Is this just a sham to push off trial court proceedings?

And there's no claim here, in all the briefing, that somehow this DPA is a sham. Boeing has been complying with it for almost a year and a half now, as the Court has heard. So there's no argument it's a sham meant to exclude the Speedy Trial Act.

So that's the lens that HSBC and Fokker I think interpret the Speedy Trial Act. And your Honor had some questions also about, you know, what other basis. The other ground they looked at was whether there was a basis under the Court's general supervisory authority.

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And, you know, without ruling on every aspect of that necessarily, in the ones before them, they both concluded that that is not -- there has not -- I think that was more HSBC really looking at the supervisory. There is not a general supervisory authority to evaluate the terms of a DPA.

I know your Honor referenced Fifth Circuit law and plea agreements, but in my research, the Fifth Circuit has not in any way diverted from that that would be applicable to a DPA. It's different from a plea agreement, as your Honor well knows.

Your Honor asked a couple questions about the Fisher decisions from the Fifth Circuit. And the Fisher decisions, one, your Honor referenced in Fisher the proposition that you can't rely on concealment of the conspiracy to be your but-for cause of your conduct. And certainly, the Fisher cases said that.

I think the Fisher cases also said for but-for, you have to look at what would the world -- take the minimum amount necessary to bring the unlawful conduct in conformity with the law and look at that but-for world, and only if the crime -- or only if the harm would not have occurred in that but-for world, is it a but-for cause.

So there's also that element of Fisher on but-for causation that I think is very important here, because

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there's so many steps that would be required to assess 1 2 whether in the but-for world this harm would have occurred. 3 The cases specifically for Fisher uses the term 4 too speculative. The district court says it's too speculative, too many steps. And the Fifth Circuit upheld 5 that on appeal. 6 7 Other cases like the In re Antrobus have used two factually and temporally attenuated. Similar concepts. If 8 9 there's too many steps, then it's not going to meet the definition. 10 And here, your Honor asked a couple of questions 11 12 about the statement of facts and the reference to that MCAS 13 may have played a role in the accidents that are contained 14 in the statement of facts. 15 I think, as Mr. Duffy was saying, the statement of facts is focusing on the -- you know, it has the criminal 16 17 information that it supports, which is the concealment of

information to the AEG about the training assessment.

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I think both accidents are extremely complex events, a lot going on in both of them. But just to illustrate, you know, what would it take to say that the concealment of information to the AEG that is alleged in the criminal information was connected with the accidents?

I mean, some of those steps you have to first ask, would the FSB report have changed in some way with respect

1 to the training, because it's training determination? 2 So would the FSB report require training on MCAS 3 in its differences training? 4 Number two, would the FSB report have required a different level of training than the level it originally 5 determined, Level-B training? 6 7 Would it have required simulator training? That's another step the Court would have to look at. 8 9 Assuming it did require training, assuming it 10 required simulator training, would that simulator training have included in its content training on what ultimately 11 12 were the accident scenarios? That's unknown. These would 13 all have been decisions to be made by the AEG. That would 14 be another step. Whatever that series of decisions that the AEG 15 16 would make, would those be carried over in exactly those 17 terms for foreign operators, because, of course, the AEG is with the FAA. It doesn't control foreign operator decisions 18 19 by other jurisdictions. 20 And then would -- if you take all those steps, 21 would that training have then -- what impact would it have 22 had in the actual scenarios that the pilots faced in the two 23 respective flights that resulted in accidents? 2.4 And that's just an example, your Honor, to walk 25 through, just on the training piece, all the steps you have

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1 to take to get to actually what happened in the accident 2 scenarios. 3 The last point I wanted to come to in the summary, 4 if you will, your Honor, is your Honor asked Mr. Cassell 5 some questions about what is it you're asking for here? Are you asking for me to undo the DPA, reopen the 6 7 DPA, or just to excise portions of it? And I don't think Mr. Cassell said he was asking 8 to have -- your Honor said, do you want me to red line it? 9 10 I think he said, I'm not asking to excise. Respectfully, their reply brief on the principal 11 12 motion, the second amended motion, pages 24 to 49, is 13 devoted to excising portions of the DPA as a remedy that 14 runs through their briefing. 15 They want to excise release from liability provisions, potentially other provisions. I would call that 16 17 a red line. So they are certainly seeking to excise 18 provisions. 19 In my research, your Honor, I have not found any case in the country that has ever done what Mr. Cassell is 2.0 21 asking, that has ever overturned a DPA on the basis of the 22 CVRA. I don't believe a case exists. 23 I would say, especially this notion of excising, 2.4 there's no support for the CVRA or the law interpreting it. 25 There's really no support for that in contract law, which a

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DPA is a contract, like a plea agreement is a contract. You

don't -
When the parties have entered into agreements, you

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When the parties have entered into agreements, you don't come behind and just excise certain portions to the detriment of one party or another. So I think that also would violate contract law to go that route.

At times their briefing also asked to just reopen or undo the DPA entirely, but I'm not sure -- they don't really mean that. It sounds maybe easy in a sense, just undo it.

But the part that they don't account for is that
Boeing has performed. As Mr. Duffy told the Court, Boeing
has performed and satisfied its obligations for a year and a
half. And that performance included funding the
\$500,000,000 fund for the crash victims. It included
payments to airlines. It included changes to Boeing's
compliance program and regular reporting to the department.

And so no one is suggesting that Boeing could get those back. Boeing can't be put back in the position it was in when it negotiated the DPA with the Department, because it's performed for a year and a half.

So I respectfully think that there's not a remedy to just reopen the DPA because Boeing can't be put back in the position it was in when it originally negotiated because it's performed.

Case 4:21-cr-00005-O Document 95 Filed 05/12/22 Page 121 of 189 PageID 1225¹²¹ 1 Your Honor, that was my core points. I had a few 2 brief points that Mr. Cassell made in argument. I will try 3 to go through as quickly as possible. 4 He raised the point that you could base CVRA rights on matters investigated. In re Wild says that's not 5 appropriate. I'm not aware of other cases, certainly none 6 7 from the Fifth Circuit, that say you can just base it on a 8 crime that was investigated. 9 In re Dean had a charged crime, ultimately, right? 10 For the plea agreement. So it had a charged crime. And that's what In re Dean looked at it. And it was not 11 12 disputed that they were victims of that charged crime in that case. 13 14 I think Mr. Cassell said at one point that we don't dispute discovery is available under the CVRA. Just 15 16 to be clear, your Honor, we certainly do dispute there is no 17 right to discovery in that statute. And the cases have, I believe, uniformly supported 18 19 that there's not the type of discovery right that 2.0

Mr. Cassell is seeking here. Even in the Jane Doe's case at the district court level, the district court ultimately did not order discovery based on the CVRA.

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It was essentially agreed to by the government under the inherent authority in that case, conceded in that case. So we certainly do dispute that.

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I think Mr. Cassell raised, for the first time 1 2 today, the notion about whether any report submitted by 3 Boeing to the department under the DPA, whether those would 4 be public. That's not been briefed to your Honor. 5 I would just say that is an HSBC case where the district court had ordered reports submitted to be public 6 7 and that was part of what was overturned by the Second Circuit in its decision. So I don't believe that would be 8 9 appropriate here. 10 And just briefly, on the arraignment and bond argument. Your Honor, in coming into this area and 11 12 responding to Mr. Cassell's motions, we tried to do a very 13 thorough look. 14 The procedure your Honor used in this case is a 15 procedure that's commonly used in DPA matters, as we tried 16 to summarize in our brief. 17 In other words, courts routinely do not have 18 arraignment proceedings in DPA matters. They're not 19 required. You know, Rule 10 says, if an arraignment occurs, 2.0 it has to occur in open court, but it does not say an 21 arraignment must occur. 22 I think it's the judgment of the presiding judge 23 whether to conduct arraignment proceedings. It certainly 2.4 need not occur. 25 Mr. Cassell mentioned the Moore case from the

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Fifth Circuit. That case is about waiver of arraignment.
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      We're not here to talk about waiver of arraignment.
 3
                It's whether arraignment need occur, and it
      certainly need not occur for the reasons I've stated. So I
 4
 5
      hope that responds to that argument.
                Your Honor, with that, I'm thankful for the
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 7
      Court's time --
                THE COURT: I do have one question here --
 8
 9
                MR. HATCH: Yes.
                                  Thank you.
10
                THE COURT: -- as it relates to In re Dean.
                                                              When
11
      the circuit prudentially decided not to mandamus the
12
      district judge, it seems to indicate that they were
      confident that the district judge would dedicate the rights,
13
14
      had heard from the victims in making the initial ruling, and
15
      then there were more stages of the case to occur, and so
16
      they were confident that the district judge would do that.
17
                Is it the case here that, if I were to do nothing,
      not change the status quo at all, but if I were to determine
18
19
      they were crime victims, then, when the government filed a
2.0
      Rule 41 motion, would I need to conduct a hearing and allow
21
      the victims to come in and speak at that moment while I
22
      considered or before I granted the Rule 41 motion?
23
      what's envisioned in this Rule 41 motion, at the end of the
2.4
      day.
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                Is that what I would do consistent with
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In re Dean's reasoning or the background to their reasoning? 1 2 MR. HATCH: I don't think that it would be 3 necessary for the Court to do that. For the reason that I 4 don't believe a Rule 41 motion requires a hearing. 5 Obviously, the Court can order a hearing on any issue. You know, any issue the Court wants to order a 6 7 hearing on. If the Court had determined they were victims, then, you know, there might be a right to attend. I just 8 9 don't think, just like it's not necessary to hold an 10 arraignment, the Court could decide on the papers to rule on a Rule 41 motion. That is not imminent. That's down the 11 12 road. 13 But I take your Honor's point. Certainly, 14 In re Dean allowed for participation prospectively, if you 15 will. It didn't go back and reopen, but it allowed for 16 participation prospectively. 17 We don't, respectfully, agree that they fall within the scope of the CVRA, but Mr. Cassell has raised 18 19 prospective interest. If the Court were to find that, you know, there could be things prospectively, I suppose, if the 2.0 21 Court were to find that they meet the statutory definition. 22 THE COURT: I'm just wondering if that was woven into the background of the facts of In re Dean. Because, 23 2.4 again, they come to the prudential decision not to mandamus 25 the judge.

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And as they're talking about it, they say that
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      they're confident that the district judge will allow
      participation, has allowed, and will allow it going forward.
 3
      And so there were other proceedings that would take place.
 4
                And so the victims would be heard at those here.
 5
      As best I can tell, if nothing happens, the only
 6
 7
      proceeding -- the only judicial act that will take place at
      some day, at some point, is the filing of a Rule 41 motion
 8
 9
      and the considering of it and presumably granting.
10
                Would that be, if I were to follow sort of the
      spirit of In re Dean, would I need to have a hearing?
11
12
                MR. HATCH: That's ahead, so -- you know, but I
13
      would suggest not, your Honor.
14
                What I would say is this. I think the Court has
15
      already approached this in the way that In re Dean mapped
      out. The Court has allowed full briefing on four motions.
16
17
      I think there may have been some other issues that came up,
      the Court has allowed full briefing on all those.
18
19
                The Court has sat and heard today arguments from
      movants' counsel and many of the movants are represented
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21
      here. So the Court has fully heard the issues.
22
                So I think the Court has done what the district
23
      court did in In re Dean, which is let -- after the issue
2.4
      came to light, let them participate in a court hearing,
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      which they did.
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The difference is that a plea agreement is 1 2 fundamentally procedurally different from a DPA, right? A 3 plea agreement is going to have a hearing. The court 4 determines whether to accept the plea agreement. 5 And then a court is going to have sentencing, and CVRA victims may have rights to attend and be heard at those 6 7 stages of the proceedings. And that's why I go back to why you can't find 8 cases that do what Mr. Cassell asks, because a DPA does 9 not -- it's a deferral of prosecution. It's not going to 10 11 have those hearings. 12 There are not going to be stages when victims 13 would appear and be heard, assuming that the DPA has been 14 complied with and goes as expected. Ultimately, you have a 15 dismissal. 16 And on that, your Honor, I don't want to presume 17 on any briefing we have to submit a dismissal, but as HSBC at least talks about, you know, a dismissal is not the 18 19 approval that I think Mr. Cassell is referring to. Do I 2.0 approve of this deal and, therefore, I dismiss it at the end 21 of compliance? 22 It's if the government made its motion to dismiss, that is another matter in the prosecutor's discretion, and I 23 2.4 think the Court views it through that lens, as opposed to

some nebulous, do I approve of all of these proceedings and

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what this deal was, if that makes sense, your Honor.
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                THE COURT: Okay. Very good. Thank you.
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                MR. HATCH: Thank you, your Honor.
                THE COURT: Any rebuttal?
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                MR. CASSELL: I don't know if you would consider a
 5
      short bathroom break?
 6
                THE COURT: No, I'm sorry.
 7
                MR. CASSELL: All right. Let me dive right in.
 8
 9
      My plan would be to follow the order of my initial
10
      presentation and touching on what the parties have said
11
      on that.
12
                Remember, we had four arguments for why the
      victims' families were crime victims under the CVRA. One of
13
14
      them dealt with the ombudsman. It's important to recall the
15
      ombudsman said, not only is there no crash investigation
16
      now, but we will let you know in the future if an
17
      investigation opens up. That never happened.
                And so for that reason alone, you could conclude
18
19
      that during that investigative process, the Justice
2.0
      Department was at least reckless with what was going on.
21
                But ultimately, when we get to now the drafting of
22
      the DPA, I think your question touched on this, at some
23
      point the government really is focusing on a resolution of
2.4
      the charges. That's the point in time where it's quite
25
      clear that they had conferral obligation.
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We heard Mr. Duffy saying, well, you know, how do 1 2 we determine? When do we know? What is the limiting 3 principle? The limiting principle is, once you put pen to paper with a criminal defendant and begin crafting an 4 5 agreement that says we're not going to prosecute you for manslaughter, at that point, you need to talk to the victims 6 7 of that manslaughter crime. You were really pushing the government to explain, 8 9 you know, does this cover manslaughter or not? I think you 10 ultimately got them to admit that they wouldn't be able to 11 prosecute Boeing for manslaughter under this agreement, 12 which is why the victims' families represent victims of 13 crime. 14 Now, we've heard a lot about In re Wild. In re Wild, I found my notes here, I think all you need to 15 16 do with regard to -- here we go -- In re Wild, is take a 17 look at page 1252, note seven. 1252, note seven of In re Wild, where the Eleventh Circuit says, look, we're not 18 19 creating a circuit split here. 20 We're not addressing the situation of In re Dean 21 where charges have been filed. At that point, victims can 22 come in. We're here in Case No. 4:21-CR-0005. We're here

in a criminal case, which we were in a civil case in the Eleventh Circuit.

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So now that leaves us with In re Dean. Again, I

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think the key point with In re Dean is the Fifth Circuit was looking at a situation where the district judge needed to do something. That's a different situation than what you have.

You can make the world right today. You can give those victims' families an opportunity to confer by agreeing to the remedies that we've proposed. And then there wouldn't be any need for any Fifth Circuit intrusion. In the In re Dean case, the Fifth Circuit had to say, well, we need to stay some proceedings here and then send it back to see what's going on. I think that's the important difference.

Now, remember the next argument that I made when I was up here just a little bit ago, the risk argument, that what Boeing did created a risk. Neither side, unless I missed it, responded to that argument, but I think your questions actually opened up, unlocked the key to that holding.

You've identified two statements of facts in the DPA, which both sides agree you can look at, that say MCAS may have played a role.

We think things actually went much further. It did play a role. And that's what the official investigative authorities found, but let's just go with may have played a role, artful pleading by, I suppose, by Boeing and the government. Well, that's a risk.

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When those passengers and crew are on those flights and MCAS may have played a role, they wanted to know everything they could, but because of Boeing's conspiracy, they didn't have the information.

So you can simply say, based on the undisputed facts here, MCAS may have played a role, that created a risk. The CVRA says, if you are creating risk to people criminally, they are harmed. And therefore, crime victim status exists.

So I think you have a path forward without ordering further evidentiary hearings or anything along those lines where you would find that the family members represent victims.

But if you want further evidentiary findings, our position is, bring it on. We are ready. Nobody talked about our 53 pages of facts, even though we spent a lot of time putting them together for your benefit, and we thought for the benefit of the parties, so they could help narrow the issues and tell us what they are disputing.

And again, today we've gotten, well, we don't agree, but we won't tell you which facts we're specifically objecting to. Those facts cover every link in the chain from the FAA, ordering simulator training, to having it apply to foreign carriers, to having those carriers then be able to safely land the planes.

So if we wanted to look at all that, let's bring 1 2 it on. Let's have an evidentiary hearing, and we will show 3 the government lots of evidence that apparently they've been 4 unable to find so far. 5 Now, the one thing we did hear from the government today is, oh, look, there are lots of other causes out 6 there. The government is conflating what the inquiry is in 7 front of you, with all respect. 8 9 The issue is not whether there were multiple causes of the crashes. There clearly were. The only issue 10 is whether MCAS was a cause of the crash. We've cited lots 11 12 of authority that says under general but-for causation, you 13 don't have to find just one single cause. I mean, the world 14 is involving, you know, multiple different causes that 15 always come together on any particular event. 16 So MCAS was clearly a cause. We have great 17 evidence on that. What we hear from the government is, oh, remember in the Forkner case, we really didn't hear a lot of 18 19 evidence about the crashes. 2.0 Well, you know why that happened. Everybody knows 21 why that happened, because on Thursday the government filed 22 a superseding indictment in that case that eliminated any 23 reference to the crashes. 2.4 And then we're told today, well, see, there really 25 wasn't a lot of connection to the crashes. Of course there

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wasn't, because the government was structuring the case, for reasons that are unclear to us, to be very, very narrow, and not include the deaths of 346 people.

So that case, whatever it holds, we don't know what the jury ultimately decided, has no bearing on this case, which very directly involves the crashes.

So let's have an evidentiary hearing if there's some dispute. We will put on evidence. We will prove beyond any doubt or certainly beyond a preponderance of the evidence, which is all that we would have to meet, that there was a direct and proximate harm.

We did hear some discussion from the government about proximate harm. Your Honor is well familiar with tort law standards. When there is a harm that is created, the question is whether the ultimate harm that resulted is within that zone of foreseeability.

When Boeing lied to aviation safety regulators about causes that could have catastrophic consequences, that's clearly within the zone of foreseeability. And we've mentioned government -- I'm sorry, Boeing documents at six points mention MCAS being linked to potential catastrophic failures. Clearly, the harms that befell 346 innocent people here were entirely foreseeable.

If there's any doubt on whether we have enough evidence, we also think the government should be required to

Case 4:21-cr-00005-O Document 95 Filed 05/12/22 Page 133 of 189 PageID 1237¹³³ disclose evidence. It's interesting they said, well, down 1 2 in Florida we agreed to disclose evidence. So it wasn't 3 litigated there. Begging the question of why aren't they agreeing 4 to disclose evidence here? And begging the guestion of how 5 could this Court possibly rule on whether there's sufficient 6 7 evidence in this case if the government is concealing evidence, which I think it became clear today they intend 8 9 to do. 10 So for all those reasons, we think that you should find that the victims' families here representing crash 11 12 victims who are CVRA crime victims. 13 And then we get into the issue of, you know, what 14 is the appropriate remedy here? 15 Let me just clear up one thing. We very much appreciate Attorney General Garland meeting with the 16 17 victims' families. That was very generous of his time to do that. 18 19 But let me also be clear. We asked to turn that 2.0 meeting into a conferral session. We said we want to have a

give-and-take discussion about this agreement.

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We were told specifically no. This is solely a listening session. And without going into the details of our meeting with Attorney General Garland, he welcomed us there, we made a presentation. He said thank you very much. Case 4:21-cr-00005-O Document 95 Filed 05/12/22 Page 134 of 189 PageID 1238¹³⁴

- I'll be back with you later. That is not conferral.

 Whatever else it is, we appreciate his time. That was not
- 3 conferral.

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Again, we appreciate your time today having us in to argue our motions, but that is not a right to confer. We want to confer with those decision makers. You heard them say today, we did not encounter any evidence that Boeing's management was responsible for the deaths of 346 people.

But we have lots of information that apparently they don't, and we want to show it to them. Maybe they will end up saying, well, we just disagree with your interpretation.

But we were promised by Congress an opportunity to confer with the decision maker before final decisions were made in this case. And that is the remedy that you should give us.

You should set aside the nonprosecution provision or the deferred prosecution provision and give us an opportunity to meaningfully confer with prosecutors to hold Boeing accountable.

Now, where is your authority to do that? The CVRA, for all the reasons I've explained, gives you that authority. But I did think -- maybe I misunderstood what the government was saying, but I think we heard a very significant change in the government's position today from

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what I was seeing in their briefs to what they were saying. 1 2 If I heard Mr. Duffy correctly, he said you do 3 have authority to direct -- to reject the DPA. That is 4 significant. You do have authority. And so then the only question is, well, when would 5 you do that? We heard from the government, well, it should 6 7 be something significant. 8 How about a violation of congressionally promised rights to 346 grieving families around the world in a case 9 10 involving the deaths of their family members? I mean, I can't come up with a law professor's 11 12 hypothetical that is a more significant reason for setting aside a DPA than something like that. And that's exactly 13 14 what you have here. 15 That's presumably why Senator Cruz wrote in to say 16 this is a very significant case that warrants your 17 supervisory power to take a close look at what happened here. 18 19 So I think we have the government admission that 2.0 you have a basis for setting aside this agreement. They've 21 even apologized for what happened in the course of executing 22 this agreement. Why that isn't an unusual circumstance that 23 would justify setting aside the agreement, I can't understand. 2.4 25 We do hear from Boeing, oh, there's never been a

Case 4:21-cr-00005-O Document 95 Filed 05/12/22 Page 136 of 189 PageID 1240136 case like this. We can't find any precedent. Right. 1 2 That's because this was unprecedented. The government 3 concealing what it was doing in a case involving 346 4 homicides for more than a year. That's unprecedented and 5 that warrants your supervisory power here. And then the last point, holding an arraignment. 6 7 I think your Honor has mentioned that, if an arraignment was held, victims would have an opportunity to come in 8 9 potentially. We look forward to that opportunity and we 10 hope that you will grant our motion on that with respect to 11 the arraignment. 12 THE COURT: Okay. I apologize for not taking all of this up at the very beginning. I clearly should have at 13 14 least inquired at the beginning and I failed in that regard. 15 So I apologize for that. 16 But I've reviewed all of your filings, and I 17 appreciate you all coming in here to make this argument. I appreciate you all traveling to Fort Worth to do that. 18 19 I will take it all under advisement, reflect on 20 it, and get an order out just as soon as I can. 21 Anything else from anybody? 22 MR. DUFFY: No, your Honor. Thank you, your 23 Honor. 2.4 MR. HATCH: No, your Honor. 25 THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

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